EU regional policy : has the UK government succeeded in playing the gatekeeper over the domestic impact of the European Regional Development Fund. by Bache, Ian
EU Regional Policy: has the UK government succeeded in
playing the gatekeeper role over the domestic impact of the
European Regional Development Fund?
Ian Bache
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Sheffield University 	 1996
Acknowledgements
There are many people to thank for their help during the
writing of this PhD. I will begin with my partner Pamela
and son Thomas, whose love made the completion of this
research both possible and worthwhile.
Stephen George, my supervisor, has given sound advice and
great support when it mattered most. I shall always be
grateful for that.
I would like to thank the many people who gave their time to
be interviewed for this research. Particular thanks goes to
my friend and former colleague Linda McAvan who has been an
important source both of information and encouragement.
Finally, I would like to thank the members of my family not
already mentioned for their continued support; Daniel and
Julie McArthur and Guy and Maria Scandlen for their
friendship overseas (and computer!); and the staff in the
politics department at Sheffield University, Patrick Seyd in
particular for his helpful comments on an earlier draft.
Ian Bache, Sheffield, May 1996.
Summary
This research sets out to test the hypothesis that the UK
government has succeeded in playing a gatekeeper role over
the domestic impact of main instrument of European Union
(EU) regional policy, the European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF)
In relation to the domestic financial impact, this research
examines the UK government's implementation of the EU
principle of additionality: that EU regional funds should be
spent in addition to planned domestic expenditure.
In relation to the domestic political impact, consideration
is given to both additionality and the implementation of the
EU principle that regional funds should be administered by
partnerships involving national governments, subnational
actors and the Commission.
While this research traces the development of the ERDF from
its origins, the primary concern is with developments after
the 1988 reform of the structural funds. In this reform,
the allocation of funding doubled, the additionality
requirement was strengthened; and the partnership principle
was introduced.
It was found that despite the sustained and sometimes
collaborative efforts of the Commission and subnational
actors to undermine the role of UK national government in
the implementation of EU regional policy, these efforts have
thus far met with limited success.
While this findings may inform existing theories of EU
regional policy-making, this thesis argues that existing
theories are too general to guide case studies of single
government action such as this. Moreover, existing theories
tend to focus on EU-level decision-making and neglect the
importance of implementation in shaping policy outcomes.
This thesis concludes by proposing a new framework for
analysing the role played by a single national government
over specific EU policy issues, throughout the policy
process. The framework outlined is described as the
'Extended Gatekeeper' approach.
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Chapter One: Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Policy
Networks
1.1 Introduction
This research sets out to test the hypothesis that the UK
government has succeeded in playing a gatekeeper role over
the domestic impact of main instrument of European Union
(EU) regional policy, the European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF) . This question relates to both the financial and the
political impact of EU regional policy in the UK.
In relation to the financial impact, this research examines
the UK government's position in relation to the principle of
additionality: the principle that EU regional funds should
be spent in addition to planned domestic expenditure. This
principle has applied to EU regional policy expenditure
since the creation of the ERDF in 1975.
With regard to the domestic political impact of regional
policy, consideration is given in particular to how the UK
government has implemented the EU principle of partnership
in administering regional funding, introduced in 1988.
Yet while a distinction can be made between policies and
principles that appear either primarily financial or
administrative, in practice the implications of these
decisions are related, the extent to which will be discussed
below.
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Defining terms and setting parameters
While EU regional policy is now classified as part of a
broader definition of EU redistributive measures known as
structural policy, this research is concerned solely with
the ERDF. In its earliest manifestations the ERDF was
called the RIJF (Regional Development Fund), or simply 'the
regional fund'. As ERDF is in current usage, this is
generally employed, but where the discussion is specific to
a particular period, the original usage of RDF or regional
fund is retained. However, it is important to note that
whether the term used is RDF, ERDF or regional fund these
are simply time-specific ways of describing what has
remained essentially the same financial instrument of EU
regional policy since its creation.
While this research traces the development of the ERDF from
its origins, and the principle of additionality as it has
developed simultaneously, the primary concern is with
developments after the 1988 reform of the structural funds.
This reform marked a watershed in the history of EU regional
policy: the allocation of funding doubled, the additionality
requirement was strengthened; and the partnership principle
was introduced.
The original data collated for this research relates to the
period from the negotiations over the 1988 reform of the
structural funds onwards. Chapter two, on the history of EU
3
regional policy up to 1988 is background to the original
research rather than being original research in itself. As
such it draws on secondary material, which has naturally
been framed in terms of the then contemporary theories. The
theoretical approach outlined in this chapter is then
applied from the negotiations over the 1988 reform onwards.
1.1.2 Towards a theoretical model
As the theoretical approach outlined below will explain,
consideration of the gatekeeper role of the UK government
requires an understanding of the whole regional policy
process, as this role is not confined to government activity
at just one level of policy-making but is played throughout.
As such, this approach acknowledges that the different
stages policy-making are inextricably linked, with
explanations of one phase of the policy process necessarily
related to developments in others.
At present, no single theoretical model exists which
facilitates analysis of EU policy-making from the EU-level
decision-making stages through implementation to policy
outcomes. The theories from international relations most
often applied to EU decision-making, intergovernmentalism
and neofunctionalism, focus on initial decision-making at
the EU-level. Yet to consider this level only might be the
equivalent of seeing the tip of an iceberg as the most
important part. Decisions taken at EU-level have to be
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implemented and, within the EU, this is the task of national
governments in fifteen different domestic contexts. Under
such circumstances, the potential f or transforming the
initial policy objectives into very different policy
outcomes is obvious. At the very least, there is the
likelihood of variations in policy outcomes between member
states once implementation stage bargaining has taken place.
Thus, consideration of policy implementation is essential
for a more complete understanding of the EU policy process.
Yet the task of developing a complete theoretical model of
the EU policy process is made difficult by the scope and
complexity of EU policy-making:
"The patterns of policy-making and the roles of
member governments and Community institutions in the
policy process vary considerably from sector to
sector depending on the extent of Community
involvement, the type of instruments used, and the
continuing importance of national policies" (Helen
Wallace 1983a, p52)
Two things are important here: the need to recognise the
differences in policy-making between sectors; and the need
to account for the influence of domestic politics.
The first of these is dealt with by limiting the scope of
this research to the main instrument of regional policy.
The second factor is more complex, but the approach outlined
below incorporates analysis which seeks to deal with
domestic politics.
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Yet the problem of model-building is complicated further by
the argument that the EU regional policy process is not
confined to what happens within the formal framework of EU
institutions, but also,
• .embraces a network of relationships and contacts
among national policy-makers in the different member
states, both directly through involvement in the
Community arena and indirectly as that arena impinges
on national policy process" (Wallace H 1977, pp 33-34)
The importance of networks to EU regional policy-making is a
central theme of this research and is considered in detail
in the concluding chapter.
Developing a theoretical approach
Levels of analysis
Theorising about EU policy-making, and EU regional policy-
making specifically, is a relatively new activity. At this
stage of its development, existing theories from
international relations and domestic policy-making are being
applied separately to analyse EU decision-making at
different levels. This chapter will bring together two
analytical approaches, one from international relations, the
other from domestic policy-making, to develop a framework
for analysing the EU regional policy process from initial
decision-making through to policy outcomes. As a starting
point it is important to be clear about the distinctions
6
made for analytical purposes between the different stages in
the policy process.
Having already noted above the practical linkages between
different stages of the policy process, it is necessary for
analytical purposes to maice a distinction between the 'EU-
level' of decision-making and the implementation cf those
decisions which is in practice a domestic matter.
Following Peterson (1995a, pp7l-76), a further distinction
is made between super-systemic and systemic levels of
decision making at EU-level. The super-systemic level is
concerned with history-making decisions, usually taken at EU
summits by the European Council, which transcend the EU's
ordinary policy process:
"History-making decisions alter the Union's legislative
procedures, rebalance the relative powers of European
Union institutions, or change the EU's remit"
(Peterson 1995a, p72)
Systemic decision-making, on the other hand, is concerned
with policy-setting decisions:
"where choices are made between alternative courses of
action according to one of several versions of the
'Community method' of decision-making" (Peterson l995a,
p73)
The dominant actor at this level is the Council of
Ministers, although less controversial matters are dealt
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with by national civil servants working together through
the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER)
Peterson's distinction between 'super-systemic' and
'systemic' levels of decision will be considered in relation
to the empirical evidence in the final chapter of this
thesis. However, to prevent confusion, for the rest of this
chapter both super-systemic and systemic levels will be
referred to under the general term of 'EU-level' decision-
making.
The use of two approaches: liberal intergovern.mentalism and
policy networks
Following the argument set out above that it is necessary
f or this research to analyse the role played by UK
government at both EU-level and at the implementation stage,
the approach taken here draws on the theory of liberal
intergovernmentalism from the international relations
tradition and the policy networks approach from the study of
domestic policy-making.
Liberal intergovernmentalism provides a theory of EU-level
decision-making, outlined below. It is from the
intergovernmentalist tradition that the metaphor of
government as gatekeeper derives and this metaphor is
8
extended here to hypothesise the role also played by the UK
government in the domestic arena where EU regional policy is
implemented. The policy networks approach provides
analytical tools through which the claims of the gatekeeper
concept can be tested more fully. However, before
discussing in more detail how the two analytical approaches
relate to each other, it is important at this stage to
explain the theory which underpins the concept of government
as gatekeeper.
1.1/3 Intergovernmentalism and the gatekeeper concept
The intergovernmentalist approach to EU decision-making is
best understood in relation to neofunctionalism (see George
1994), which was the dominant theory of European integration
in the 1950s and early 1960s. 	 The main contention of
intergovernmentalism is that national governments have
managed to retain control over the key developments within
the EU and thus determine the pattern of integration. In
contrast, the neofunctionalist school argues that national
governments have increasingly found themselves caught up in
a web of interdependence that makes them less able to resist
pressure towards greater integration.
While neofunctionalists stress the unique nature of
international co-operation in the EU, intergovernmentalists
suggest that intergovernmental co-operation in the EU is not
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significantly different from that in other international
regimes. Consequently, when a national government perceives
that a policy developing within that regime may challenge
its domestic priorities, it will act as 'gatekeeper' to
prevent this. Thus,
"On the one hand, intergovernmentalism is presented
as showing that the European Community is not
distinctive as compared to other international
organisations. On the other hand, there is the
picture of ' . . . governments holding the gates between
the Commission and their domestic politics' "(Bulmer
1983, p356)
Hoffmann' s intergovernmentalism
The evolution of the gatekeeper metaphor to describe the
relationship between member state governments and the EU
owes much to the intergovernmentalist approach to European
integration taken by Stanley Hoffmann (1966 and 1982).
Hoffmann's early work is best understood in relation to
neofunctionalist arguments about the integration process.
Hoffmann asserted the logic of diversity over the logic of
neofunctionalism. The logic of neofunctionalism, he argued,
was:
"that of a blender which crunches the most diverse
products, overcomes their different tastes and
perfumes, and replaces them with one, presumably
delicious juice" (1966, p882)
The logic of diversity was the opposite:
"it suggests that, in areas of key importance to the
national interest, nations prefer the certainty, or
the self-controlled uncertainty of national self-
reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the
untested blender" (Hoffmann 1966, p882)
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Thus, while states might accept integration in what Hoffmann
described as 'low politics' policy areas, they would not be
dispossessed in the areas of 'high politics'
Hoffmann's formulation initially contrasted social and
economic policies as low politics, with foreign and defence
policies as high politics. However, this was later refined
when Hoffmann acknowledged the weakness in his initial
suggestion that foreign policy and defence were always 'high
politics' and social and economic issues exclusively 'low'
"Whether an issue falls into one or the other
category depends on its momentary saliency - on how
essential it appears to the government for the
survival of the nation or for its own survival, as
well as the specific features of the issue .. . and
on the economic conjuncture" (Hoffman 1982, p29)
It was Hoffmann's image of Community policy making that was
described as, "coloured by visions of governments acting as
'gatekeepers' between their domestic political systems and
the Community" (Webb 1983, p24)
The gatekeeper concept criticised
Despite the considerable resources apparently available to
national governments wishing to resist the development of
unwanted Community policies, Hoffmann's gatekeeper argument
provoked criticism:
"the overdrawn, unidimensional image of national
governments favoured by intergovernmentalists is
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inadequate and distorting. Far from being efficient
and effective gatekeepers straddling the threshold
between their national boundaries and the Community,
national governments more closely resemble the
juggler who must apply himself simultaneously to the
tasks of keeping several balls in the air and not
losing his balance on the rotating platform" (Webb
1983, p32)
Coordinating policies at a national level was identified as
a particular problem for member states:
"Governments have to construct policy packages which
both adequately represent domestic claims and yet
can, nevertheless, be used as an effective
bargaining counter in Brussels. What emerges in
many instances.., is something less than a
consistently highly orchestrated and impenetrable
national front" (Webb 1983, pp24-25)
Tensions within the national polity over Community issues
raise questions about whose interests are being articulated
by national government representatives in Brussels. That
government representatives cite the claims of the 'national
interest' in Brussels does little to clarify the matter. As
Helen Wallace (1977, p47) suggests, "...the assertion of so-
called national interests often is a substitute for the
articulation of partisan preferences".
Coordinating national positions
The manner in which national governments have formulated
positions on Community issues has varied, not least because
of the different administrative traditions and political
objectives of member states. These variations have produced
differences in the coherence of national positions at EU-
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level. For example, Britain and France have been identified
as national governments which have:
"attempted to develop rigorous coordination of
different domestic viewpoints, through mechanisms
that reflect the expression of monolithic postures
in the Communities. In principle they have
permitted these governments to identify a relatively
consistent line in Community negotiations" (Helen
Wallace 1977, p48)
However, while a centralised domestic administrative
structure may make the UK negotiating position more
consistent and thus less prone to influence from within the
EU policy arena, this does not necessarily mean it reflects
a domestic consensus on the issue. This will be tested with
regard to regional policy issues (chapters four to seven)
A range of other factors have been identified as influencing
the national response to Community issues:
"the quality and morale of the national civil services,
the internal balance of each government, and the
constitutional role of their political leaders... The
differential weights of particular ministries and their
client groups in each national process are relevant -
the strength of the British Treasury and Foreign
Office" (Wallace H 1977, p48)
Where disputes arise between domestic actors over Community
issues, it is suggested that national governments have
demonstrated flexibility. As Helen Wallace put it:
"In situations where domestic controversy arises on
a Community issue, the prevalent response of member
governments is to bend to pressures rather than
attempt to pursue a strategy based on long term
considerations" (1977, p49)
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This argument provides a useful reference point for
considering the domestic dispute which arose in the UK over
the additionality issue (chapter four)
The weaknesses in the early intergovernmentalist theories,
and in particular the under-emphasis on the importance of
domestic politics, have subsequently been addressed. Bulmer
(1983) contributed to this and Moravcsik (1993) brought this
contribution into a revised model which he called 'liberal
intergovernmentalism', the main aspects of which are
described below.
1.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism
Moravcsik argued that at the core of liberal
intergovernmentalism are three essential elements: the
assumption of rational state behaviour, a liberal theory of
national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist
analysis of interstate relations (1993, p480)
1.2/1 State rationality
Moravcsik suggested that the assumption of rational state
behaviour provides a general framework of analysis, within
which:
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"the costs and benefits of economic interdependence are
the primary determinants of national preferences,
while the relative intensity of national preferences,
the existence of alternative coalitions, and the
opportunity for issue linkages provide the basis for an
intergovernmental analysis of the resolution of
distributional conflicts among governments (1993,
pp480-l)
At any particular moment state action is 'minimally
rational', in that it is "purposively directed toward the
achievement of a set of consistently ordered goals or
objectives" (tvloravcsik 1993, p481)
However, Moravcsik departed from the traditional realist
approach to state action which portrays national governments
foreign policy-making as isolated from the influence of
pressure groups. For Moravcsik, national governments act
purposively in the international arena, but their goals are
not determined in isolation. Instead,
"the foreign policy goals of national governments are
viewed as varying in response to shifting pressure from
domestic social groups, whose preferences are
aggregated through political institutions" (1993,
p481)
The concept of national interest thus remains important in
international negotiations but is not defined solely by
national governments. Moreover, the national interest is
defined differently over time as the demands of competing
domestic groups change and new policy directions are
accepted by national governments. Thus, an understanding of
domestic politics is central to understanding how states
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interact: rational state behaviour is based on domestically-
constrained preferences. This, Moravcsik argued, implies
that conflict and co-operation between states can be
modelled as a process that takes place in two successive
stages: each government first defines its interests, then
governments bargain among themselves to try and realize
those interests (Moravcsik 1993, p481)
Metaphorically, these two stages shape demand and supply
functions for international co-operation for each
government:
"A domestic preference formation process identifies the
potential benefits of policy co-ordination perceived by
national governments (demand), while a process of
interstate strategic interaction defines the possible
political responses of the EC political system to
pressures from those governments (supply) (1993, p481)
It is the interaction of demand and supply, of national
preference and international strategic opportunities, which
shapes the foreign policy behaviour of states. In bringing
together these two aspects, liberal intergovernmentalism
unites a liberal theory of national preference formation
with an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate
bargaining and institutional creation (Moravcsik 1993,
p482)
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1.2/2 Liberalism, national preference formation and the
demand for integration
Liberalism and state-society relations
Liberal theories of power in democratic societies argue that
the most fundamental actors in politics are individuals and
interest groups and that state policies are decisively
shaped by the interaction of individuals and groups in civil
society. As this is true for domestic polices, so it is
true for foreign policy. As Moravcsik put it:
"The most fundamental influences on foreign policy are,
therefore, the identity of important societal groups,
the nature of their interests, and their relative
influence on domestic policy" (1993, p483)
It is acknowledged that the interests of societal groups in
any country will be themselves shaped by both domestic and
international factors.
To explain why individuals and interest groups are so
important in shaping government policy, Moravcsik argues
that the 'primary interest' of governments is to maintain
themselves in office, which in democratic societies requires
the support of individual voters, interest groups arid
bureaucracies (1993, p483). It is through the political
processes which facilitate the expression of the views of
these actors - domestic institutions and the practices of
political representation - that national interest emerges.
It is this domestically-defined national interest that
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governments then bring to international negotiations. Where
the pressure on government to adopt a particular policy
stance is ambiguous or divided, it has greater discretion in
these negotiations (Moravcsik 1993, p484)
Policy areas and national preferences in the EC
Moravcsik argued that to understand national positions on
different issues, there is a need to understand separate
patterns of domestic policy-making in different sectors:
"Different policy areas engender characteristic
distributions of costs and benefits for societal
groups, from which follow variations in patterns of
domestic political mobilization, opportunities for
governments to circumvent domestic opposition, and
motivations for international co-operation" (1993,
p488)
Within the EU, he identified three distinct categories of
policy areas: commercial policy, market access and producer
interests; socio-economic public goods provision; and
political co-operation, EC institutions and general income
transfers. The subject of this research, regional policy,
is classified within the last of these categories. 	 Of
regional and structural policies, Moravcsik said:
"Since they are neither significant enough to provide
major benefits to the donors, nor widely enough
distributed to represent a policy of common interest -
are most plausibly interpreted as sidepayments in
exchange for other policies" (1993, p496)
This is a helpful interpretation which suggests the need for
decisions over regional policy to be explained in the
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context of decisions in other policy areas. As will be
discussed later (chapter seven), the Peterson distinction
(below) between super-systemic and policy-setting decisions
aids understanding of this connection.
1.2/3 Intergovernmentalism, Interstate Bar gaining , and the
Supply of Integration
The range of potential outcomes from international
negotiations is thus shaped by the domestically-determined
national positions adopted by governments. As Moravcsik put
it:
"The configuration of domestically determined national
preferences defines a 'bargaining space' of potentially
viable agreements, each of which generates gains for
one or more participants" (1993, p496-7)
If governments are to emerge from international negotiations
with a common policy, they must collectively decide on a
policy within the 'bargaining space' available, as defined
by domestically-defined national positions. Where the
policy area discussed has important distributional
consequences, governments are unlikely to be indifferent to
which policy is decided on. The reconciliation of
conflicting interests among states to produce a common
policy is achieved through the process of negotiation. The
outcome is a reflection of the bargaining power and
intensity of preferences of the governments involved.
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Bargaining power and the intensity of preferences
Moravcsik argued that the distributional outcomes of
international bargaining are determined by numerous factors.
These include:
"the nature of the alternative policies and coalitions,
the level of symmetry of information and the extent of
communication, the sequence of motives, the
institutional setting, the potential for strategic
misrepresentation of interests, the possibility of
making credible commitments, the importance of
reputation, the cost-effectiveness of threats and side-
payments, and the relative preferences, risk
acceptance, expectations, impatience, and skill of the
negotiating parties" (1993, 497-8)
Because of the range of factors which may affect the
outcome, and the difficulty of testing each of these
empirically through the case study method, there is a danger
of generating 'irrelevant or illusory results' without
contextual justification (Moravcsik 1993, p498) . However,
Moravcsik argued that the bargaining leverage each member
state exercises in international negotiations 'stems most
fundamentally from asymmetries in the relative intensity of
national preferences', in that the more intensely a
government wants agreement, 'the more concessions and the
greater effort they will expend to achieve it" (1993, p499)
Moravcsik suggested that in EU negotiations, where
intergovernmental co-operation is voluntary, there are three
likely determinants of interstate bargaining power: (1)
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unilateral policy alternatives ('threats of non-agreement');
(2) alternative coalitions ('threats of exclusion'); and (3)
the potential for compromise and linkage (1993, p499)
"A necessary condition for negotiated agreement among
rational governments is that each perceive the benefits
of co-operation as preferable to the benefits of the
best alternative available to it. Where there exists a
policy more desirable than co-operation, a rational
government will forego agreement" (1993, p499)
The ability of governments to refuse agreement provides them
with one of their most fundamental bargaining weapons. The
extent to which a government wants agreement on a particular
issue can therefore be judged in terms of how attractive its
alternative options are.
(1) Unilateral policy alternatives and the threat of non-
agreernen t
The most obvious alternative available to governments
reluctant to accede to an international agreement is to
pursue a unilateral alternative. The extent to which a
government is likely to do this depends on its assessment of
the costs and benefits of the alternatives of unilateral
action or international agreement. This determines the
intensity of the government's preference for agreement. The
problem of bargaining on the basis of the intensity of
preferences is, as Moravcsik put it:
"that the need to compromise with the least forthcoming
government imposes the binding constraint on the
possibilities for greater co-operation, driving EC
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agreements toward the lowest common denominator" (1993,
pp500-501)
However, because it is in the interests of governments to
compromise rather than threaten veto, a lowest common
denominator outcome does not necessarily meant that the
agreement finally reached reflects the preferences of the
least compromising government, "only that the range of
possible agreements is decisively constrained by its
preferences" (Moravcsik 1993, p501)
(2) AlternatIve coalitions and the threat of exclusion
Where alternative coalitions can be formed which exclude
some states from agreement, this provides a second type of
option to governments in addition to unilateral action.
Where the alternative coalition option exists, it:
"strengthens the bargaining power of potential
coalition members vis-a-vis those threatened with
exclusion" (1993, pp5O2-3)
(3) Compromise, side-payments and linkage at the margin
As Moravcsik deemed regional policy to be 'most plausibly
interpreted as side-payments in exchange for other
policies', it is the third category of determinants that is
of most obvious relevance for this research.
The range of viable agreements that are available to
governments in international relations is defined by the
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unilateral and coalitional policy alternatives available.
While all governments prefer an alternative within that
range to the status quo, the point at which agreement will
be reached is more difficult to predict. However, "in
general, bargaining power will depend on the intensity of
preference at the margin" (Moravcsik 1993, p504) . Again,
the governments most likely to concede most are those who
have the least attractive alternative options, particularly
where there is time pressure or a possible breakdown in
negotiations. Where there is less uncertainty, the final
agreement will reflect preferences of "governments that
place a greater value on concessions at the margin"
(Moravcsik 1993, p505) . Importantly, however:
"governments often have differential preference
intensities across issues, with marginal gains in some
issue-areas being more important to them than to other
governments" (Moravcsik 1993, p505)
Where this is the case, there may be an incentive for
governments to seek gains in issue-areas where they have
strong preferences in exchange for giving concessions in
others that are deemed less important. In linking issues in
this way, all parties might gain:
"Even where a set of agreements, taken individually,
would each be rejected by at least one national
government, they may generate net advantages for all if
adopted as a 'package deal'" (Moravcsik 1993, p505)
1.2/4 Supranational institutions and the efficiency of
decision-making
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Moravcsik suggests that there is no contradiction between
the existence of strong supranational institutions and
intergovernmentalism. Rather, the transfer of authority by
national governments to supranational institutions is an
acceptable trade-off by governments in exchange for
perceived advantages. In this view, the supranational
institutions of the EC are seen to enhance the power of
national governments in two ways: by increasing the
efficiency of interstate bargaining; and by strengthening
the position of national governments within their domestic
political systems by structuring a "'two-level game' that
enhances the autonomy and initiative of national leaders "
(Moravcsik 1993, p507)
Supranational regimes and functional regime theory
Moravcsik viewed the EU as unique among international
regimes in that governments pool sovereignty in two ways:
through qualified majority voting in the Council of
Ministers and by the delegation of sovereign powers to semi-
autonomous central institutions (1993, p509) . One
consequence of this is that national governments become more
dependent on the agenda-setting role played by the
Commission. The role of the Commission in selecting among
viable proposals provides it with considerable power, at
least in theory:
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"The power is particularly decisive when the status quo
is unattractive, creating general support for action,
yet there is considerable disagreement between national
governments over what should replace it. Often a
number of proposals might gain majority support, among
which the Commission's choice is decisive (Moravcsik
1993, p512)
However, while member governments may see this Commission
power as a cost of international co-operation, they judge
the benefits from this to be greater than the cost.
Moravcsik identified two other important instances in which
governments have been willing to risk delegating authority
to supranational institutions: external representation and
enforcement (1993, pSll) . With regard to these and the
Commission's agenda-setting powers,
"there is a substantive commitment to the achievement
of broad goals, while the political risk is small,
insofar as each delegated decision is relatively
insignificant (1993, p511)
Significantly, however, the scope of delegation in each
instance is limited by national governments. Most relevant
here is that the Commission's agenda-setting power is said
to be limited "by the Council's previous delegation of power
and ultimate decision. . ." and "only the enforcement power of
the ECJ (European Court of Justice) appears to have resulted
in a grant of independent initiative to supranational bodies
beyond that which is minimally necessary to perform its
functions - and beyond that which appears to have been
foreseen by governments" (Moravcsik 1993, p513) . Moravcsik
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argues that the decisions of the Court have transcended the
expectations of national governments, but the expansion of
judicial power is seen as an anomaly (1993, p513) and does
not constitute a serious challenge to the
intergovernmentalist view:
"Only where the actions of supranational leaders
systematically bias outcomes away from the long-term
interest of member states can we speak of serious
challenge to the intergovernmentalist view" (1993,
p514)
Supranational institutions and two-level games
While theory about international regimes has traditionally
focused on their role in reducing the transaction costs of
collective decision-making for national governments,
Moravcsik suggested that EC institutions perform a second
function:
"namely to shift the balance of domestic initiative and
influence. On balance, this shift has strengthened the
policy autonomy of national governments at the expense
of particular groups" (1993, pp514-515)
National governments seeking to overcome domestic opposition
can exploit their relations with EU institutions as part of
a 'two-level' strategy. Supranational institutions assist
national governments in two ways:
"by according governmental policy initiatives greater
domestic political legitimacy and by granting them
greater domestic agenda-setting power (Moravcsik 1993,
p515)
Moravcsik's argument was that national governments have
greater political legitimacy in the domestic arena for
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policies that appear to have the support of EC institutions,
while the increased domestic agenda-setting powers of
national governments comes from decisions taken in the
Council meetings that exclude other domestic actors. These
advantages of EC membership are deemed important by national
governments: so much so, Moravcsik suggests, that,
"Ironically, the EC's 'democratic deficit' may be a
fundamental source of its success" (1993, p515)
1.2/5 Beyond liberal intergovernmentalism
Absent from Moravcsik's analysis of EU decision-making is
detailed consideration of the role of the Commission. While
he acknowledges the Commission has agenda-setting powers,
there is no discussion of whether the Commission has its own
agenda which may conflict with the supremacy of national
governments in the EU decision-making process. The concept
of an active Commission is not considered central to the
liberal intergovernmentalist argument:
"Where neo-functionalism emphasizes the activ'e role of
supranational officials in shaping bargaining outcomes,
liberal intergovernmentalism stresses instead passive
institutions and the autonomy of national leaders"
(Moravcsik 1993, p518)
Yet there are competing views of the importance of the
Commission which emphasise the tension between its view of
the 'Community interest' and that of the national interest
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claims of governments. These competing views need to be
considered alongside Moravcsik's analysis, and will be dealt
with in the section on policy networks below.
1.3 Policy networks
The policy networks approach, while not strictly a theory of
decision-making, provides tools through which decision-
making can be analysed at. both the EU-level and at the
implementation stage. Through the simultaneous use of the
policy networks approach, the validity of the
intergovernmentalist claims can be tested more fully. In
essence, the policy networks approach is used here to inform
intergovernmental theory.
1.3/1 The policy networks approach
The policy networks approach is most simply understood as a
model of interest group intermediation developed in response
to the perceived shortcomings of the existing pluralist and
corporatist models. Rhodes and Marsh (1992) suggested that
neither pluralism or corporatism provide an adequate picture
of interest group intermediation primarily because they
attempt a general model of relations between government and
interest groups, rather than acknowledging the varying
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nature of these relations in different policy areas. Thus,
an advantage of the policy network approach is that it
recognises that the relationships between actors is
different in different policy sectors. As such, it takes a
disaggregated approach to policy analysis. Further, this
approach also recognises that:
"in most policy areas a limited number of interests
are involved in the policy-making process and
suggests that many fields are characterised by
continuity, not necessarily as far as policy
outcomes is concerned, but in terms of the groups
involved in policy-making" (Rhodes and Marsh 1992,
p4).
However, to recognise that a policy network exists, is not
to pre-judge the influence of the network on policy
outcomes. To explain policy outcomes, it is necessary to
use the policy network approach in conjunction with a theory
of power within networks.
Rhodes and Marsh (1992) argued that a particular strength of
the approach is that it can be applied using different
models for explaining power in liberal democracies. Whether
different models of power sit equally comfortably with the
policy network approach will be considered in the concluding
chapter of this thesis. The important point to make at this
stage, however, is that the policy networks approach does
not constitute a predictive theory of policy making.
Rather,
"Policy networks are essentially descriptive
theoretical tools which simply help order facts and
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evidence in novel ways. However, policy networks
can be used to anticipate and explain policy outputs
by providing insights into how and why decisions
were taken which produced them." (Peterson 1993,
p31)
The predictive element in the approach in this research is
provided by intergovernmentalism.
1.3/2 Policy network typoloqy
A policy network has been defined as "a complex of
organisations connected to each other by resource
dependencies and distinguished from other clusters by breaks
in the structure of resource dependencies" (Benson 1982,
cited in Rhodes and Marsh, 1992, p13) . Rhodes (1988, p77)
developed Benson's definition by arguing that networks have
different structures of dependencies, structures which vary
along five key dimensions: the constellation of interests
membership;	 vertical	 interdependence;	 horizontal
interdependence; and the distribution of resources.
Constellation of interests - the interests of
participants in a network vary by service/economic
function, territory, client group and common expertise
(and most commonly some combination of the foregoing);
Membership - membership differs in terms of the balance
between public and private sector; and between
political-administrative elites, professions, trade
unions and clients;
Vertical interdependence - intra-network relationships
vary in their degree of interdependence, especially of
central or sub-central actors for the implementation of
policies for which, none the less, they have service
delivery responsibilities;
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Horizontal interdependence - relationships between the
networks vary in their degree of horizontal
articulation: that is, in the extent to which a network
is insulated from, or in conflict with, other networks;
The distribution of resources - actors control
different types and amounts of resources, and such
variations in the distribution of resources affect the
patterns of vertical and horizontal interdependence.
(Source: Rhodes 1988, pp77-78)
In his work on sub-central government in the UK, Rhodes
(1988) distinguished between five different types of
networks ranging from highly integrated policy communities
to loosely integrated issue networks. Between these, on
what is seen as a continuum, are professional networks,
intergovernmental	 networks	 and	 producer	 networks
respectively.	 At one end of the continuum, policy
communities are characterised by:
"stability of relationships, continuity of a highly
restrictive membership, vertical interdependence based
on shared service delivery responsibilities and
insulation from other networks and invariably from the
general public (including Parliament). They have a
high degree of vertical interdependence and limited
horizontal articulation" (Rhodes 1988, p78)
At the other end of the continuum, issue networks are
distinguished by their large number of participants and
limited degree of interdependence. The structure tends to
be atomistic and stability and continuity are 'at a premium'
(Rhodes 1988, p78)
Professionalized networks are dominated by one class of
participant: the profession. In short, "professionalized
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networks express interests of a particular profession and
manifest a substantial degree of vertical independence
whilst insulating themselves from other networks" (Rhodes
1988, pp78-79)	 The intergovernmental networks Rhodes
referred to are those based on the representative
organisations of local authorities (1988, p79) . Producer
networks are distinguished by the prominent role of economic
interests (Rhodes 1988, p80)
1.3/3 Power dependence
While it is important to recognise the importance for
policy-making of identifying competing interests interacting
within networks, it is equally important to acknowledge that
actors in these networks are unable to compete equally in
the policy process. There is interdependence between those
involved but this is "almost always asymmetrical" (Page
1982, cited by Rhodes 198Gb, p5) . Moreover, in some cases
it is possible to talk of 'unilateral leadership' . The
extent to which some actors are able to determine the
behaviour of others is accounted for in the Rhodes model by
the concept of power dependence.
The existence of policy networks is evidence of some
resource interdependence between the actors involved. Each
actor possesses certain resources which allow it to
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influence decision-making. It is the extent to which actors
control resources which determines the potential power they
have in each situation. These 'resource dependencies' are
the key variable in shaping policy outcomes:
"They set the 'chessboard' where private and public
interests manoeuvre for advantage" (Peterson 1993,
p28)
Between different sets of actors, different types of power
resources will be significant. The important resources for
this research are discussed below (1.3.5)
1.3.4 Policy networks and implementation
A strength of the policy networks approach is its emphasis
on policy implementation, which Rhodes described as:
"a process of bargaining between conflicting
interests. Policy does not 'fail' but is actually
made in the course of negotiations between the
(ostensible) implementors" (Rhodes 1986a, p14)
Implementation can be a crucial phase in the policy-making
process and cannot simply be seen as a straightforward
administrative follow on. Barrett and Hill (1986, p5)
stated:
"The political processes by which policy is
mediated, negotiated and modified during its
formulation and legitimation do not stop when
initial policy decisions have been made, but
continue to influence policy through the behaviour
of those affected by policy acting to protect or
enhance their own interests".
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The problem for the European Commission in securing policy
objectives agreed at EU-level is its dependence on national
administrative systems for policy implementation. These
systems are inevitably closely linked to the authority of
national governments. Thus, the implementation stage of EU
policy-making can offer national governments considerable
scope for shaping policy outcomes. 	 Where the system of
government in a member state is highly centralised, the
scope for national government influence within the domestic
networks is that much greater.
At the same time, however, the implementation stage of EU
policy-making broadens considerably the number of actors
involved in the policy process so that the nature of
conflict over policy may change and new tensions may arise.
Thus, the involvement of new actors at the implementation
stage may also present new opportunities for the Commission.
"the Commission hopes to stimulate demands from
groups who have become its clients, thereby
increasing pressure for additional policy
instruments at the Community level" (Helen Wallace
1977, p57)
Thus:
"it is only by examining the implementation phases
that we can begin to gauge the effectiveness of
Community policies in relation to the objectives
sought, or to assess whether the experience of
member governments and other national agencies at
this stage increases or decreases their support for
an extension of Community activity" (Helen Wallace
1977, p57)
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1.315 Policy networks and EU regional policy
Preston's policy network approach
Preston (1984) began looking at the impact of ERDF in the UK
through traditional 'top-down' implementation theories.
This followed the argument that the Commission 'implicitly
or explicitly' viewed the development of Community regional
policy this way. The Commission visualised an ideal model
of implementation in which,
"implementation is seen primarily as a 'management'
task in coordinating and administering the various
elements in a hierarchical structure... if the
policy is clearly enunciated, designed to meet local
needs and properly funded then it should succeed,
and compliance can be ensured with a judicious mix
of 'carrots and sticks'" (Preston 1984, p17).
However, Preston concluded that such a model failed to
explain why the Commission had not achieved its regional
policy objectives. 	 He identified six constraints that
determined actual behaviour in the implementation of
regional policy:
1) the initial definition of implementation
stressed technical and administrative constraints
and failed to recognize that the problems had their
roots in the larger policy process in which there
was no agreement on policy goals;
2) the implementation structure was composed of
complex, multi-organizational linkages;
3) the policy was modified, at times substantially,
by the conflicts of interest and bargaining between
the affected parties at all levels of government;
4) the outcome of such bargaining hinged on the
pre-existing distribution of power, most notably the
pre-eminence of national governments both
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domestically and at the supranational level:
however,
5) the distribution of power is not static, the
Commission is itself a political actor maintaining
principles and interests different from the existing
balance of national interests, and consequently
national perceptions and position can be redefined;
but,
6) in seeking to redefine national perceptions and
position the Commission has to balance:
- its own initiatives with the interests, and its
need f or the agreement, of member states; and
- uniformity of policy with legitimate national and
subcentral variations
(Preston 1984, pp25-39)
Preston suggested that a policy networks approach might
provide a more useful means of understanding the outcomes of
the Community regional policy process than the top-down
implementation model. Despite the fact that this approach
was not fully developed in Preston's work, and that a number
of changes have taken place since 1984 affecting the ERDF
policy process, his conclusions provide useful insights.
The EU-level regional policy network
Preston argued that it was possible to identify a
'Community-level' regional policy network through which
important decisions were taken. This was based around the
Council structure in Brussels:
"It consists of the permanent representatives of the
ten (sic) member states sitting in Coreper or in the
various specialist working groups set up to discuss
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particular policies and issues and the ministers and
officials who come to Brussels on a more or less
reg-ular basis to make decisions in the Council of
Ministers (Preston 1984, p274)
This description of an EU-level regional policy network
would appear to meet some of the policy community criteria
set out by Rhodes (1988) : it has a highly restrictive
membership and insulation from other networks.
However, Preston's description of an EU-level policy
community is misleading in that all the actors identified
were representatives of national governments of one kind or
another. He concluded that: "all the major decisions
surrounding the creation of the Regional Fund were taken in
the Council structure" (1984, p277) . Yet in Rhodes's
terms, for a policy community to exist there needs to be a
'high degree of vertical interdependence: the only
interdependence Preston identified for these actors was with
representatives of other national governments.
Thus, Preston's argument that this group could be described
as a policy community because "...they are largely in
agreement on the need to maintain the existing pre-eminence
of national governments within the EC policy process" (1984,
pp276-277) , misses the point that other actors outside
national government elites have to be involved in decision-
making for the concept of a policy community be relevant and
useful. What Preston appears to be describing is an
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intergovernmental network rather than a policy community.
Had Preston argued that other actors were involved, it is
unlikely his policy community criterion outlined above would
have been satisfied. Particularly when he himself says of
the Commission: "the assumption that underpins its long-term
objectives is that regional problems are best tackled by
supranational policies and decision-making" (1984, p54)
From the evidence of Preston's research, the application of
the policy networks approach in a strict manner at EU-level,
seeking adherence to the Rhodes' typology, is problematic
although networks clearly exist. However, Preston's
research was particularly informative in emphasising the
role of the Commission as a political actor with a set of
interests distinct from those of national governments. This
argument is reinforced by the bureaucratic politics model
outlined by Guy Peters (1992) . In this approach:
"the component units of a government administrative
apparatus are assumed to be quasi-autonomous actors
with their own goals, which they pursue through the
policy-making process" (Peters 1992, p115)
Under the Treaty of Rome, the Commission is charged with
promoting the Community interest and as such has been seen
as a promoter of measures designed to further European
integration. In its attempts to do this, the Commission has
been identified as engaging at times in 'active policy-
making', by interpreting its role within the Community
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system as the promoter of great leaps forward. Active
policy-making is described as:
"(an) ambitious attempt to establish new or radically
different policies, such that the problem-solving
exercise requires big jumps" (Wallace H 1977, p35)
In this view, national governments, that carry more baggage
in terms of domestic considerations, are more likely to
engage in 'reactive policy-making'. This constitutes,
"an incremental process along a continuum, in which
the solving of problems depends on the gradual
adjustment of existing policies" (Helen Wallace
1977, p35)
As the Council and the Commission approach EU-level
decision-making from different starting points, conflict
inevitably arises. In most situations characterised by
conflict, national governments are seen to have a distinct
advantage:
"Community policies emerge if and when the member
governments are collectively persuaded that they
offer a package that will mitigate problems that
otherwise they would be left to grapple with alone
or through other channels. If a Community proposal
fails to gain acceptance, governments can continue
with their existing national policies or find some
other means of achieving their existence" (Wallace H
1977, p44)
Thus, for the Commission to gain acceptance for its
proposals, it has to somehow find coherence in the varying
positions of the different governments. As discussed in the
section on liberal intergovernmentalism, the fact that
national governments attach different levels of importance
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to different issues can make the task of the Commission
difficult and the end result may be the emergence of the
'lowest common denominator' option. However, where national
governments are committed in broad terms to agreement on
policy, but differ over details, this may provide bargaining
space in which the Commission may advance its agenda.
National level EU regional policy network
At national level, Preston suggested that the,
"major decisions which affect the scope and
direction of regional policy are taken within the
interdepartmental network centred in Whitehall, and
particularly in the Departments of Industry and
Environment" (Preston 1984, p278)
Again, Preston described this level of network as a policy
community, primarily because of the shared assumptions of
the actors involved in decision-making, the most crucial of
these relating to the primacy of domestic macro-economic
considerations in matters relating to EU regional policy.
While the Department of Industry was identified by Preston
as the 'lead department' in this network, with
responsibility for taking the initiative in negotiations
with other departments, the suggestion that macro-economic
considerations dominate the overall UK approach to EU
regional policy indicated the overriding influence of the
Treasury view:
"Evidence submitted by the Department of Industry both
to the House of Lords Select Committee Investigations
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into regional incentives in general, has always
stressed the importance of seeing regional aid in its
national economic context, particularly in its relation
to other public expenditure programmes" (Preston 1984,
p27 8)
However, while there is evidence for EU regional policy
coordination between government departments, ultimately
constrained by Treasury public expenditure priorities, there
is a problem whether it is appropriate to describe the
interdepartmental networks of central government as a policy
community when, in Rhodes's terms, policy communities are
characterized by "vertical interdependence based on shared
service delivery" (1988, p78) . This criterion would seem to
require that a valid description of the national ERDF
network would need to include other service deliverers, in
this case, representatives of local government.
At this stage it would be reasonable to assume that there is
a national level ERDF policy network in the UK which
includes central and local government actors and others
involved in implementation, but that this network is
unlikely to constitute a policy community. There would seem
to be no reason why those agencies spending ERDF, for
example local government, would share the assumption of
central government actors relating to the primacy of macro-
economic considerations, when these assumptions would
restrict the ERDF spending power of local authorities. It
will be part of the task of this research to identify if a
national policy network exists, and if so, ask the question
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of where this might fit into the Rhodes typology, and, more
importantly, whether this is a useful aid to understanding
national level decisions over ERDF.
Regional level ERDF policy networks
While consideration of regional level ERDF policy networks
was not a feature of Preston's work, it is included here
because of the creation of regional level partnerships for
administering the structural funds resulting from the 1988
reform. Moreover, Preston did look at networks in Scotland
and Northern Ireland which provided some insights at the
sub-national level.
Preston said of Scotland:
"The existence of a territorial rather than a
functional department linked to other public bodies
unique to Scotland fosters a strong sense of regional
identity, and it can therefore be argued that a
distinct Scottish policy community exists, focused on
Edinburgh rather than Whitehall" (Preston 1984, p279).
Preston also described a Northern Ireland 'policy community'
which had,
"a distinct territorial identity, made more acute by
the continuing uncertainty over the constitutional
status of the province" (Preston 1984, p279)
No assessment was made of networks in Wales as it did not
feature as a case study in Preston's work.
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It will be a task of this research to consider whether it is
appropriate to talk of regional networks in England in the
light of the 1988 reform of the structural funds, and to
discuss whether the relationships in these differ from the
ERDF networks centred around the territorial ministries of
Scotland and Wales.
While the ERDF may have generated the development of policy
networks at national and regional level, it is thought
likely that there would be overlap between these in terms of
the organisations represented and the personnel involved.
This research will assess whether this is the case and
whether such overlap affects policy outcomes.
1.5/6 Explaining policy outcomes
While much of the policy networks material is developed to
assist the ordering of information and identification of key
actors, the concept of power dependence discussed above
provides a means to explain policy outcomes. While the
controlling position of central government within the
British system of government would suggest it has the
capacity to dominate domestic networks, particularly when
the other major actor is local government, this may depend
on the issue.
	 Thus, as Marsh and Rhodes (1992, p261)
suggested:
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"the more peripheral issues are to the government's
programme and electoral fortunes and the more
limited the range of interests affected, the greater
the capacity of the network to run its own affairs".
In his study of ERDF policy-making, Preston (1984),
following the Rhodes model, identified three types of
resources as particularly important for actors bargaining
over regional policy at both EU-level and during
implementation. These were political, financial and
informational resources.
Political resources
Preston (1984) suggested that political resources were the
most important type in the domestic ERDF networks.
Political resources consisted of the ability to make policy
and decide on the framework for policy implementation.
Preston (1984, p51) argued that at Community level, member
states' governments had a near monopoly of this resource
through control of the Council of Ministers. This gave
national governments "both the legal right to enact
legislation and the recognition, both by the Commission and
actors in the member states that their use of this resource
is 'legitimate'" (Preston 1984, p51).
However, Preston's work does suggest the need to incorporate
a stronger explanation for Commission action within an
essentially intergovernmentalist framework, because the
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Commission has challenged the political legitimacy held by
national governments' over regional policy-making:
"The Commission implicitly challenged the legitimacy of
member states' possession of this resource for it has
in effect claimed that it can provide better for the
'needs' of the regions than can member states" (1984,
p51)
The Commission's attention to regional policy in particular
stems not only from a commitment to reducing spatial
economic disparities, but also from a basic political
motivation:
"regional inequality is seen to be an impediment to
Community integration and, therefore, to the emergence
of a truly cohesive power bloc" (Pinder 1983, p113)
Thus, while Preston's work in 1984 did not suggest that the
Commission had secured sufficient political resources to
challenge the pre-eminence of national governments in EU
level negotiations, he drew attention to the sometimes
competing objectives of the Commission and national
governments:
"The problems of differing objectives, values and
interests thereby provide the substance of the
bargaining that takes place between the member
states who have political resources and the
Commission which wants them" (1984, p51-52)
Financial resources
The possession of financial resources, like political
resources, ". . .is both a lever to be used and a goal to be
attained in bargaining." 	 Again, Preston (1984, p52)
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acknowledged the supremacy of national governments over the
major financial decisions affecting regional policy at EU
level.
At the implementation stage, however, where the Commission
has overall responsibility for the management of regional
policy, it does possess control over financial resources.
As with other resources, the control of financial resources
is likely to be contested. Thus, the extent of Commission
control over ERDF allocations and the importance of this for
influencing policy outcomes will be given full consideration
in this research.
Informational resources
Preston defined informational resources as:
"those resources possessed by an organisation that
allow it to maintain independence and discretion in the
design and implementation of policy" (1984, p53)
This is a resource which has significance in the regional
policy field not least because of the need for technical
expertise on the dynamics of regional economies. The
possession of informational resources, as with the other
types already discussed are both used and sought after in
bargaining:
"An organisation's claim to the possession of technical
expertise can be used to justify a bid to control more
financial resources, and vice versa, for much of the
bargaining that has characterised the implementation of
the EPDF has been over the exchange of data necessary
to evaluate policy development" (Preston 1984, p54)
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Both the Commission, through its comprehensive Community-
wide reports on regional problems, and local authorities
through their detailed local knowledge and experience of
regional development, were identified by Preston as having
possession of informational resources (1984, pp54-55) . The
Commission's expertise was important to its assumption that
underpinned its view that regional problems were best
tackled at supranational level 	 (Preston 1984, p54)
However, national governments countered the Commission's
claims by arguing that,
"their experience and proximity to problem regions
necessitates their maintaining a strong and distinct
base of information and expertise" (Preston 1984, p55)
The distribution of informational resources and their
importance in shaping policy outcomes will be assessed in
relation to the empirical evidence of this research.
1.5/7 The emergence of 'rules of the game'
As Preston (1984) argued, the pattern of the distribution of
these political, financial and informational resources
constrains the room for manoeuvre of the various actors in
the bargaining process. Consequently,
"The experience of these actors in bargaining with each
other over a period of time gives rise to common
perceptions of what is possible and 'permissible'"
(Preston 1984, p56)
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These shared expectations have, over time, produced implicit
'rules of the game' with regard to EU regional policy-
making. For example, at EU level:
governments 'expect' the Commission to bring
forward proposals which try and upgrade the overall
Community interest but without costing any particular
member state too dearly. Likewise, the Commission
'expects' these governments to eventually reach
agreement whilst continuing to defend their 'national
interest'. Gradually these shared expectations give
rise to implicit 'rules' . . . (Preston 1984, p56)
These 'rules' define the approximate guidelines for how
actors must behave within the bargaining process if their
actions are to be deemed acceptable. 	 However, different
rules may apply to the behaviour of different actors within
the bargaining process. This is illustrated by considering
three rules of the game identified by Preston.
The first rule is that of 'national interest'. Again, this
difficult concept arises, the essence of its importance here
being that, "member states recognise that each has the right
to decide at what point a policy initiative proposal
infringes their own area of legitimate activity" (Preston
1984, p56) . The concept of national interest has already
been	 theorised	 in	 the	 section	 on	 liberal
intergovernmentalism which deals with EU level bargaining.
However, understanding this concept in the context of other
rules not theorised by liberal intergovernmentalism provides
a fuller understanding of the constraints within the
bargaining process.
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The second rule identified by Preston was the Commission's
right of active policy-making. This is the understanding
that:
"the role of the Commission in the EC's policy process
is to posit Community as distinct from national
political interests, and as the guardian of the EC's
'conscience' is expected to come up with proposals that
are necessarily more radical than member states would
wish" (1984, p57)
This is one rule that is not explicitly identified in
Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism. This rule
suggests that national governments recognise the
Commission's right to promote 'great leaps forward', while
at the same time themselves often seeking to limit
Commission 'interference'
"The existence of this rule explains why member states'
governments have committed themselves to the
development of a policy area at European level whilst
frequently working to undermine its implementation"
(Preston 1984, p58)
While national governments claim ultimate control over
regional policy for themselves through the Council of
Ministers and through their dominant position at the
domestic implementation stage, "their prior commitment to an
EC regional policy allows the Commission to make a
counterclaim that it should be involved in the design and
implementation of policy. . ." (Preston 1984 p58)
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The third rule is that of 'local authority consultation'.
This is the recognition given to the main implementors of EU
regional policy by both the Commission and, perhaps more
grudgingly, national governments, of their right to be
consulted both at national and supranational level. While
the Commission's position in EU-level bargaining may be
strengthened by the legitimacy gained from consultation with
sub-national government, which is excluded from formal EU-
level regional policy negotiations, this rule may have more
contradictory implications for a national government which
may be "partially conceding to local authorities the right
to undermine its own authority", particularly in the
domestic arena (Preston 1984, p59)
The value of the rules of the game argument outlined by
Preston for this research is in developing understanding of
the concept of national interest as part of a broader
context of unwritten rules which govern bargaining over EU
policies. At the EU-level, the concept of national interest
has to be placed alongside the competing claims of the
Commission and in particular, its 'active policy-making'
role. This role and the consultation accorded to local
authorities may be deemed less important than claims of
national interest but are deemed legitimate by all parties
nonetheless.
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The 'rules of the game' pattern is similar at the
implementation stage. 	 While the claims of the national
government may be paramount, it also has to recognise that
other participants in the policy-making process will have
competing interests that they will attempt to promote and
are legitimate in doing so.
The resolution of conflict over policy issues at both EU and
domestic levels is determined in negotiations where the
various actors are able to mobilise different types and
different levels of resources in order to influence policy
outcomes. This process of bargaining takes place within
'rules of the game' which are supported implicitly by each
actor. When these rules are not adhered to, the bargaining
process is undermined and agreement less likely.
1.6 Core executive studies
While the model developed here has thus far distinguished
between the competing interests of different actors at EU
level and within domestic polities, there is a need also to
draw attention to the importance of not treating individual
institutions as monoliths. Rather, within national
governments, the Commission and sub-national government
there also may be competing interests with differing views
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on how each institution should act and react in a particular
policy area.
Where there is conflict within an organisation this may
hinder that organisation's ability to mobilize resources.
The work by Dunleavy and Rhodes (1990) on 'core executive
studies' provides some insights into this. While this work
has focused on UK central government, the arguments could be
applied equally to other institutions involved in the EU
regional policy process. This work fits in neatly with the
disaggregated and differentiated approach to the study of
policy-making put forward in the policy networks literature.
In their work on UK central government, Dunleavy and Rhodes
(1990) rejected the traditional focus on the relative
influence on decision-making of the Cabinet and Prime
Minister, suggesting instead that:
"The innermost centre of British central government
consists of a complex web of institutions, networks
and practices surrounding the PM, Cabinet, cabinet
committees and their official counterparts, less
formalized ministerial 'clubs' or meetings,
bilateral negotiations, and interdepartmental
committees. It also includes some major
coordinating departments - chiefly, the Cabinet
Office, the Treasury, the Foreign Office, the law
officers and the security and intelligence services"
(Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990, p3).
They reject the term 'cabinet government' 	 as an
inappropriate and misleading way of describing the central
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policy coordinating machinery in British government and
suggest:
"If British core executive research is to flourish a
broader range of theories need to be used to help
create far more systematic and diversified modes of
empirical analysis" (IJunleavy and Rhodes 1990, pl9).
Of the potential research areas which might broaden the
scope of debate, Dunleavy and Rhodes suggested 'decisional
studies' might be the most promising. Existing
institutionalist literature, they suggest, "operates in
terms of broad generalizations across different types of
issues and time periods. There are very few decisional case
studies of cabinet-level issues" (IJunleavy and Rhodes 1990,
p20). Related to the decisional studies approach is the
strategy of 'differentiated accounts of the central
executive'. As Rhodes (1981) argued, the starting point for
this is the increased recognition of the importance of
policy communities:
"The problem-solving capacity of governments is
disaggregated into a collection of sub-systems with
limited tasks, competences and resources... At the
same time governments are more and more confronted
with the tasks where both the problems and their
solutions tend to cut across the boundaries of
separate authorities and functional jurisdictions...
A major task confronting political systems in any
advanced industrial country is therefore that of
securing coordinated policy actions through networks
of separate but interdependent organisations" (Hanf
1978, cited by Rhodes 1981, pp. 1-2)
This argument suggests that within the core executive, there
will be different patterns of activity depending on the
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policy area,	 and that "managing interorganisational
relations is a key function even in 'high policy' issues at
national level" (Dunleavy and Rhodes, p21)
The arguments of Dunleavy and Rhodes add a further layer of
complexity to analysing in particular, the behaviour of
central government in the EU regional policy process: not
only must we recognise differences and tensions within the
national polity, but we must also guard against viewing
central government as monolithic. It cannot be presumed
that government will function in the same way on each
particular issue. Already, this chapter has noted how the
Treasury view has traditionally shaped the context in which
EU regional policy decisions are taken within UK central
government. It is, however, likely that there is more than
the Treasury view within UK central government which may be
voiced if the position taken is widely criticised. This
study will test the importance of this argument.
1.7 Summary
The question asked in this research is "has the UK
government succeeded in playing the gatekeeper role over the
domestic impact of the ERDF?". To answer this question
requires consideration of the role played by the UK
government both at EU-level and at the domestic
implementation stage of EU regional policy-making. As such,
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this chapter has outlined an approach which emphasises the
inter-connectedness of the various levels of policy-making,
but for analytical purposes distinguishes between EU-level
decision-making and policy implementation. At EU-level
there is a further distinction, following Peterson (l995a),
between 'super-systemic' and 'systemic' decision-making.
At both levels of decision-making, this research will test
the gatekeeper concept, which has its origins in the
intergovernmental approach to analysing EU-level decisions.
At both EU-level and at the implementation stage, this
concept is taken as a metaphor for national government
dominance of the policy process. Analysis of both levels of
decision-making will be informed by the policy network
approach, with particular emphasis on the power dependence
framework.
The early work on core executive studies is included to
stress the need to account for the possibility of both
inter-organisational and intra-organisational tensions in
the policy-making process.
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Chapter Two: The creation and development of the ERDF to
1988
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2.1 Introduction: traditional ways of viewing EU regional
policy-making
In the early stages in the development of EU regional
policy, EU level decision-making was widely perceived as
intergovernmental. Helen Wallace argued:
"by no stretch of the imagination could the story of
the ERDF vindicate the approach of the functionalist
or neofunctionalist" (1983, p97)
The consensus was such that in 1992, McAleavey's work on
regional policy was developed in response to,
"previous accounts of the regional policy process in
the Community as a virtual paragon of
intergovernmentalism" (1992, p3)
While intergovernmentalists acknowledged a limited role
played by the Commission, and to a lesser extent the
European Parliament, national governments were seen to
dominate an EU-level process restricted to institutional
actors. In 1983, Helen Wallace noted:
"There has been almost no scope f or the direct
involvement of extra-governmental interests for
regional lobbies or other pressure groups, much
though they have lobbied and pronounced on the
various proposals tabled and important though their
influence may have been at the national level"
(1983, p97)
Helen Wallace (1983) rejected the applicability of
transnationalism, interdependence, or regime theory for
explaining the character of the EU-level regional policy
process. Partly because regional policy had traditionally
been a very domestic area of governmental activity and
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partly because regional policy does not constitute a
discrete functional sector. In looking for an appropriate
analytical framework to explain EC regional policy, Wallace
stressed the need to take into account two things. Firstly,
that the ERDF emerged from a controversial debate within the
Community regarding resource distribution at both EC and
national level, central to which was the point that:
"To give EC institutions authority over regional
policy is to enable influence to be exerted over
allocative decisions both among and within states,
territory which is contested on both political and
economic grounds" (H Wallace 1983, p98)
Secondly, Wallace emphasised that regional policy is a
horizontal, not vertical policy sector. As such, it has
repercussions for economic and social welfare in general,
for patterns of employment and for agricultural and
industrial development. Not only does this limit the scope
for the 'systematic mobilisation of interests', but also
means that regional policy does not,
"readily permit the interactions through the
formally established hierarchy of committees to
acquire a life and purpose of their own in the way
that has characterized agricultural policy in the
EC" (H Wallace, 1983 p98)
Regional policy as 'high politics'
Hoffman's revision of his definition of what constitutes
'high' and 'low' politics provided a flexibility necessary
for understanding the significance attached by member
governments to EU regional policy. Chapter two opens the
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discussion of how national governments have viewed EU
regional policy and how this has affected the policy-making
process. The fact that regional policy involves decisions
over the allocation of financial resources has ensured that
at least some member governments have maintained a keen
interest in shaping EU regional policy.
Yet while national governments have at all times been
centrally involved, other actors - notably the Coon at
EU level, and sub-national government at domestic level in
particular - were expected to become more important. As
Wallace (1977, p57) suggested, very early in its
development, regional policy was identified as an area in
which the Commission might seek to develop important
linkages with sub-national actors:
"the Commission hopes to stimulate demands from
groups who have become its clients, thereby
increasing pressure for additional policy
instruments at the Community level. This has
been a marked aspiration behind the utilization of
the ESF, and it is likely, that there will be a
similar, though more cautious trend in the case of
the RDF" (Wallace H 1977, p57)
Subsequently, sub-national actors have become formally
involved in the regional policy process at the
implementation stage through the 1988 reform of the
structural funds. This reform provided clearly identifiable
networks operating within the domestic EU regional policy
process. Whether the anticipated increased participation of
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the Commission and other actors at EU level means that this
stage of the policy process can no longer be seen as
essentially intergovernmental is a matter of consideration
for this research. The model set out in chapter one
suggested a modified liberal intergovernmentalism offered
the most appropriate way of understanding EU level regional
policy-making. The applicability of this model will be
assessed in relation to the policy process in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. Here however, it is the early history of
regional policy and its main instrument, the ERDF that is
considered and the evaluation offered is that provided by
other authors writing nearer the time. The model developed
in the opening chapter will refer briefly to events up to
1988 in the final chapter, but will be mainly applied to the
period after where new empirical data is provided.
2.2. The creation of the ERDF
As the main purpose of this research is to consider events
after the 1988 reform of the structural funds, relatively
little space will be given over to the considerable history
up to that point. The 1988 reform brought a strengthened
additionality requirement and the introduction of
partnership arrangements, thus providing the context for
potentially the most significant changes in the UK's
treatment of ERDF since its introduction in 1975. Yet to
understand the nature of EU regional policy, and ERDF as the
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main financial instrument of this, it is important to
understand something of its origins.
The Treaty of Rome and regional policy
The Treaty of Rome was framed in the context of a liberal
market philosophy and made no specific commitment to the
creation of a Community regional policy. However, it did
outline the objective of promoting throughout the Community
.. a harmonious development of economic activities, a
continuous and balanced expansion" (Article 2). The
preamble to the Treaty also made reference to "reducing the
differences between the various regions and the backwardness
of the less favoured regions" (Swift 1978, plO) . Moreover,
a number of early financial instruments had regional
implications: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC);
the European Investment Bank (EIE); the European Social Fund
(ESF); and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee
Fund (EAGGF).
Early Community financial instruments with regional aspects
The Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC in 1952 in part
anticipated the decline of Europe's coal and steel
industries. In doing so, the Treaty included financial
measures to aid the 're-adaption' and 'reconversion' of
workers facing redundancy, resettlement or in need of
retraining.	 At the same time, under Article 46 of the
Treaty, loans were made available for new investment in coal
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and steel. The main benificieries from the ECSC have been
Britain, France, Germany and Belgium.
	 The ECSC will be
phased out by 2002 as the Treaty of Paris intended.
The European Investment Bank was set up in 1958, under
Articles 129 and 130 of the Treaty of Rome. This provides
cheap loans to assist projects assisting economic
development in the EU's less prosperous regions.
Modernization and conversion schemes in declining industrial
areas have been a high priority. The EIE draws its funds
from borrowing on international capital markets and through
borrowing on a large scale is able to pass on loans at a
preferential rate.
The European Social Fund was also created in 1958, to
improve the employment opportunities of workers. The ESF
aims to improve mobility within the labour market primarily
by providing funds for the training and retraining of
workers affected by industrial restructuring. Following
changes made in 1971, ESF assistance became more targeted to
certain industrial sectors and disadvantaged groups (young
people and migrant workers) . The most recent changes are
outlined in the next chapter on the 1988 reform of the
structural funds.
The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund was
agreed in 1962 as part of a the Common Agricultural Policy
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(CAP) package. The guidance section of the EAGGF provides
investment aid for a variety of measures to assist farmers
in less-favoured areas. This funding has been used in
conjunction with other financial instruments to assist
agriculture as part of broader regional development
strategies.
Despite the fact that a number of Community financial
instruments with regional aspects existed in the 1950s and
1960s, this did not constitute a Community regional policy.
In fact, as one observer stated, these instruments were
"quite as likely to work against each other as together and
obviously failed to do anything more than pay lip service to
the words of the Treaty" (Swift 1978, p12) . Commissioner
George Thomson, who was centrally involved in the creation
of the ERDF in 1975, went even further in his assessment of
existing measures:
"Forms of Community aid, useful and well justified
as	 individual acts of policy, when looked at as
a whole... appear to be actually widening the
regional gap rather than closing it" (New Europe,
Spring 1976, cited in Swift 1978, p14)
In the period immediately before the creation of the ERDF,
regional policies in individual member states had
proliferated. This fact, despite their mixed success, made
the question of a more significant Community role over
regional policy more controversial. Consequently, it was
not until 1973 that the decision was taken to introduce a
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Community regional policy and not until 1975 that it came
into effect.	 The background to the negotiations over
regional policy provides a large part of the explanation for
the nature of the policy that emerged.
2.2/1 Origins of the ERDF
An appropriate starting point for considering the origins of
EU regional policy is 1961, when the Commission convened a
conference in Brussels to provide the broad outlines of what
a Community approach would be. This started a process of
Commission deliberations which resulted in the Commission
presenting its first report on regional policy to the
Council of Ministers in May 1965. The report called for
better information on the Community's problems and the
coordination of the range of instruments with a regional
impact. This would require more activity on the
Commission's part and greater coordination over regional
instruments between the Commission and member governments.
In 1968, a directorate general (DG) for regional policy was
created in the Commission. This brought together those
parts of the Commission and the High Authority of the ECSC
with responsibility for existing regional measures (Vanhove
and Klaassen 1987, p398)
In 1969, the Commission again made regional policy proposals
to the Council without eliciting much support. These
proposals, however, were to provide the basis for the
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Commission's arguments in the 1973 negotiations. In 1969,
the Commission argued that the absence of a policy to
address the Community's regional problems undermining the
effectiveness of other policies, notably, the implementation
of economic and monetary union. Among the Commission
proposals this time was the creation of a Regional
Development Fund (RDF), targeted through regional programmes
and overseen by a standing committee on regional development
made up of national governments and the Commission.
Despite a subsequent period of consultations with member
states, there was no significant movement on the
Commission's proposals until 1972. Only Italy, potentially
the greatest beneficiary from regional measures, was in
favour, with the other member governments having different
reasons for opposition:
"The French Government wanted to limit Community
funding to the EIE, with no role for the
Commission. The Belgians would accept no
Community policy unless it would endorse its own
policy towards internal tensions. The German
government favoured only modest regional
expenditure restricted to the EAGGF and argued
that the principle of redistribution should be le
just retour" (H Wallace 1977, p141)
The efforts of the Commission and indeed the Italian
government in 1969 may not have made any immediate impact,
but did maintain the profile of the issue. After 1969, a
combination of factors elevated the status of regional
policy. Helen Wallace identified three factors as
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particularly important: the issue of economic and monetary
union (EMTJ); the proposed enlargement of the Community to
include Britain and Ireland; and the issue of national aids
to industry.
The completion of economic and monetary union, an objective
of the Treaty of Rome, had been given impetus by the Werner
Report of 1970. This report provided a plan to achieve
economic and monetary union in the Community within ten
years, necessitating institutional reform and closer
political integration. The Werner Report also concluded
that continued regional disparities within the Community
would militate against EMU being achieved. From the
subsequent agreement to work towards EMU, taken at the Hague
Summit of 1969, came a recognition from the Council that
some form of action would be needed to remedy the problem of
regional imbalances. The prospects of further enlargement
brought another dimension to the context of the introduction
of EU regional policy.
The proposed enlargement of the Community to include Britain
and Ireland, would bring with it a new set of disadvantaged
regions to deal with. While the problems of Ireland,
largely related to agriculture, might have been dealt with
by reforming the EAGGF, Britain had a number of regions
suffering industrial decline.	 Moreover, Britain was also
likely to be a net contributor to Community funds and was
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subsequently keen to explore avenues through which it could
secure reimbursement.
The third factor providing the context for the introduction
of EC regional policy was the Commission's plans for
controlling member state aid to industry. In June 1971, the
Commission recommended to the Council that state aids should
be clearly measurable (transparent) and that there should be
a distinction between the 'central' or wealthy areas of the
Community and the 'peripheral' regions. The level of state
aid to central areas should be no more than 2O of total
investment (Helen Wallace 1977a, p142) . In line with Treaty
of Rome provisions to ensure fair competition within the
Community, this proposal was endorsed by the Council in
October 1971. The effect was to encourage a higher
proportion of national aid to be targeted at less-favoured
regions. As such, the decision placed constraints on
national regional policy and thus intensified interest in
developments at Community level.
The Paris Suiimtit of 1972 and its aftermath
By 1972, regional policy was high on the Community agenda.
At the Paris Summit of that year, the new member states were
involved in discussing future priorities for the first time
and it became clear that senior political leaders had
accepted the case for a regional policy. The final
communication of the summit outlined the agreement that a
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'high priority' should be given to correcting the
Community's structural and regional imbalances which might
work against the achievement of economic and monetary union.
Further, the Heads of Government invited the Commission to
prepare a report on the Community's regional problems and
suggest appropriate solutions. It was also agreed that
member states would undertake to coordinate their regional
policies and that a Regional Development Fund be
established. The RDF, in coordination with national aids,
"should permit, progressively with the realisation
of economic and monetary union, the correction of
the main regional imbalances in the enlarged
Community and particularly those resulting from
the preponderance of agriculture and from
industrial change and structural unemployment"
(Vanhove and Klaassen 1987, p402)
For advocates of a significant Community role in regional
policy, it appeared that the main battle had been won. But
it was a difficult journey from this declaration to the
formal introduction of ERDF in 1975.
From policy decision to policy detail
In the new Commission of the enlarged Community, Britain
secured the regional policy portfolio. This post was filled
by the pro-European George Thomson, a former Labour
minister. Thomson quickly set about the task of producing
the regional policy proposals the Commission had been
charged with. The result was the Thomson Report of May
1973, which provided a Community-wide analysis of regional
68
problems, outlined the main features of an EC regional
policy, set out how the RDF would operate, and provided
principles for co-ordinating national regional policies.
while the Thomson Report recognised the need for a Community
regional policy to be implemented in conjunction with
states' own policies, at the same time,
"the Commission also laid down objectives which would
in the long term lead to these national regional
policies becoming less important" (Preston 1984, p66)
On 25 July 1973, the Commission laid before the Council the
draft for a decision establishing a Committee for Regional
Development to work towards the co-ordination of national
policies. This would comprise two members from each state
and a representative from the Commission. At the same
time, the Commission put to the Council a proposal to
establish the RDF. The RDF would have 2250 Mua (Monetary
Units of Account) allocated to it for a three year period
and would be distributed on the basis of 'objective
Community indicators'. There would be no national quotas,
but it was proposed that only areas which had been
nationally designated for assistance would be eligible.
A decision on the Commission proposals was expected in the
Autumn of 1973, but by September the scale of the obstacles
in the way of agreement had become clearer. There was
conflict between member states over both the general
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principles of regional policy suggested and the detailed
proposals of the Thomson Report:
"These ranged from the enthusiasm of the
demandeurs - Britain, Ireland and Italy - to the
caution of Germany the chief paymaster, with
various degrees of enthusiasm and reluctance being
expressed by other governments" (H Wallace 1977a,
p145)
Halstead (1982), in his study of the negotiations, suggested
that the Irish and the Italians were pushing for a larger
regional fund, while the French with support from the Dutch
and the Belgians wanted any agreement on the fund linked to
the co-ordination of national policies. Following the
Commission's publication of the proposed eligible areas in
October 1973, more disagreements emerged:
"First, the Germans, Dutch and Danes considered
that the eligible regions were too widely drawn;
second, the Germans wanted all infrastructure
development to be linked to industrial
development; third, it was still uncertain whether
national aid would have to be a precondition of EC
aid. . ." (Preston 1984, p68)
On top of this, Britain, along with Ireland and Italy argued
that the regional fund was too small, whereas France wanted
to link the fund to the issue of national aids.
The politics of the early negotiations
It became clear from the	 early	 exchanges	 that
intergovernmental bargaining would come to dominate the
creation of the RDF. 	 Whatever embryonic regional policy
networks may have existed at Community level at this stage,
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the major decisions over the nature and size of the Fund
were being thrashed out by the representatives of member
governments either in COREPER or in Council. As Preston
argued:
"whilst the different national positions were
still capable of mutual adjustment it was becoming
clearer that the major protagonists saw the Fund
issue in terms of national interest. The attitude
adopted on the problem of eligible regions were
conceived primarily in terms of the 'politics of
redistribution' rather than of the 'economics of
regional development'" (1984, p68).
While the national interest considerations of member
governments were the overriding determinant of the outcome
of the regional fund negotiations, even at this early stage
the Commission had played a significant role in keeping the
issue alive and putting forward proposals. However, the
context of the negotiations changed significantly with the
outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, threatening
the prospects for agreement on regional policy.
The oil embargo of Arab oil producers in response to the Yom
Kippur War, "had the dual effect of preoccupying the
immediate attention of governments and of suggesting a
linkage between the two issues to the German Government" (H
Wallace 1983, p93) . The consequence of this linkage was
that the German government reflected on its previous
enthusiasm to pay for a regional policy from which there
would be no immediate return. Germany became particularly
antagonistic towards the claims of the relatively oil-rich
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UK government, which was pleading a special case for
assistance from the new regional fund.
Negotiations came to a turning point when the UK government
refused to give Community members preference for its oil in
return for UK benefits from the regional fund. Argument
over this changed the spirit in which negotiations took
place:
"in failing a major test of solidarity, member states
subsequently felt less inclined towards any financial
or 'spiritual' generosity towards each other" (Preston
1984, p69)
As progress on the Commission's proposals gradually ground
towards a halt, a new dimension was introduced into the
negotiations with the election of a minority Labour
Government in Britain in February 1974 which was committed
to renegotiating the terms of Britain's entry to the
Community and holding a referendum on continued membership.
In this context, British interest in the proposed regional
fund was marginalised, and with the attention of the UK
government focused on other matters, the prospects for
agreement on regional policy became even more distant.
Despite the British 'problem', however, the Commission
maintained its efforts on regional policy and was supported
in its efforts by the Irish and Italian Governments.
Prospects for renewed progress on regional policy were
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enhanced with the elections of both Schmidt in Germany and
Giscard in France in the Autumn of 1974: "for Schmidt in
particular the impending British referendum on EC membership
highlighted the need to bring the whole protracted debate to
a speedy conclusion" (Preston 1984, p74) . However, no
significant progress was made until the end of 1974 when the
Irish and Italian governments threatened to sabotage the
Paris Summit scheduled for December that year unless other
member governments gave a firm commitment to establishing a
regional fund.
Largely in response to Irish and Italian threats, member
states agreed at the Paris Summit to establish a regional
fund for a three-year trial period to begin on the January
1, 1975. The Fund was endowed with 300 Mua for its first
year of operation and 500 Mua for each of the following two.
This total of 1,300 Mua fell some way short of the
Commission's original proposal at the Paris Summit of 1972
for 3,000 Mua, but was welcomed as progress. At the same
time, it was decided that distribution of the regional fund
should take place according to national quotas. These were:
Percentage (p6)
Belgium	 1.5
Denmark	 1.3
Prance	 15.0
Germany	 4.4
Italy	 40.0
Ireland	 6.0
Luxembourg	 0.1
Netherlands	 1.7
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United Kingdom 28.0
(Ireland was also to receive a further 6 Mua taken
proportionally from the other countries, with the exception
of Italy)
Once the European Parliament had authorised the creation of
a supplementary budget to finance the Fund, the RDF was
formally established in March 1975. Also created was a
Regional Policy Committee, consisting of two representatives
of each member state and one from the Commission, with the
Commission also providing the secretariat. The chief tasks
of the new committee would be to provide a forum through
which national regional policies could be coordinated and to
set the overall framework for regional policy in the
Community.
2.2/2 The UK government and the creation of the ERDF
The British approach to the early ERDF negotiations has
typically been described either as 'ambiguous' (Wise and
Croxford 1988, p175), 'ambivalent' (H Wallace 1977a, p151)
or 'ambivalent and, to a large extent contradictory'
(Preston 1984, p73) . The Wilson governments of 1964-70,
simply sought reassurance that Community rules
would not impede its freedom of manoeuvre in the
allocation of economic resources to regional
development" (H Wallace 1977a, p151)
The Heath government of 1970-74 had less of a commitment to
domestic regional policy to protect than its predecessor
and, as more pro-European, was,
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"... urgently in need of actions which could be used to
show a sceptical public and Parliament that concrete
benefits were resulting from common market membership"
(Wise and Croxford 1988, p173)
The Heath government's enthusiasm for a Community regional
policy was evidently more instrumental than ideological. As
George put it:
"All that was being sought was an
institutionalised subsidy from the Community for
British expenditure in the regions. An integrated
Community policy for regional development was not
on the agenda" (George 1985, p146)
The problems facing the British negotiators during the
period of the Heath government were related to the impact of
the proposed Community regional policy on domestic measures,
particularly on state aids, and the probability that the EC
would be viewed by an already suspicious public as
restricting national government's ability to respond to
difficult economic circumstances. At the same time,
however, the UK government had prioritised ERDF as a means
of both reimbursement and of demonstrating the benefits of
membership to its domestic constituencies. In addition,
increased public demand for greater devolution of power to
Scotland and Wales within the UK increased, prompting the
government to see the regional fund as a potential means of
diverting extra resources to Scotland and Wales in
particular at no extra cost to the Treasury (Preston 1984)
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Yet the Heath government did not only have to satisfy
demands from outside government, but also had to deal with
the competing demands of its own departments:
"The Treasury's prime concern was with the balance
of payments dimension and with securing financial
aid that would reduce domestic expenditure; by
contrast the DTI, Scottish Office and Welsh Office
looked to the RDF as a source of extra support for
their client groups" (H Wallace 1977a, p153)
Almost two decades later, the disputes over the direction of
ERDF receipts in Britain was to reveal remarkably similar
inter-departmental conflicts. In the 1970's at least, these
disputes meant that "the possibility of a well integrated
policy was thus constrained by intra as well as
intergovernmental compromise" (Preston 1984, p73)
However, the relegation of the regional fund issue at EC
level following the election of a Labour government in 1974,
was accompanied by its relegation in the domestic arena. As
the matter fell from public view, public expectations of EC
regional policy diminished:
"This, combined with increasing inflation,
strengthened the hand of the Treasury in arguing
that Britain's share of RDF should not increase
the total expenditure on regional development in
the UK, but rather cushion it against setbacks" (H
Wallace 1977a, p154)
When regional policy negotiations resumed, the Labour
government was concerned to retain national government
control over the process to ensure that EC regional fund
receipts could be directed to areas prioritised domestically
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and not by the Commission. The importance of securing
national government control over the implementation of EC
regional policy became even greater to the UK government as
the pressures for devolution for Scotland and Wales grew.
With powerful assemblies in Scotland and Wales a realistic
prospect, there would be potential for these sub-national
authorities to deal with the Commission directly and by-pass
the national government gatekeeper. Thus, the UK government
wanted to shape the outcome of EC regional policy
negotiations to strengthen its domestic control:
"There was a determined reluctance to allow the
availability of Community funds to become a
resource in domestic politics except in so far as
it could be controlled by central government" (H
Wallace 1977a, p154)
The UK government's position in the early ERDF negotiations
was thus shaped by its recognition of the importance of the
implementation stage of the regional policy process.
Moreover, the government recognised that to act successfully
as gatekeeper at the implementation stage, required it to
act as a vigilant gatekeeper during EC-level negotiations.
The various stages in the policy-making process from the
initial negotiations over policy decisions in principle
through to the policy outcomes are inextricably connected
and this was demonstrated by the UK government's actions.
2.2/3 The Commission's position
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As there were differences within the UK government over EC
regional policy, so were there differences within the
Commission, "given the cross-linkages between regional
policy and other areas of policy (H Wallace 1977a, p160)
However, these differences were not substantive, but
concerned with detail rather than broad principles.
Following the Paris Summit, when the Commission became more
focused on regional policy, these differences became
insignificant. It was recognised that, now responsive to an
enlarged Community, "the whole Commission stood to win
credit if the RDF could be set up quickly" (H Wallace 1977a,
p146)
That the eventual deal to be struck on the ERDF would be
essentially the result of intergovernmental bargaining was
immediately recognised by George Thomson, who consequently
made no effort to construct a coalition of non-governmental
interests in pursuit of his objective. Instead,
"...the Commission concentrated on constructing a
package of rewards that would satisfy the demandeurs
and persuade the other member governments that the RDF
would further their interests too" (H Wallace 1977a,
p147)
That importance of regional policy to national governments
was illustrated by each member state being allocated an ERDF
quota. Although in some instances the quota secured by
national governments was very small, "none was prepared to
forgo the possible leverage that a stake in the Fund would
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give it, both in bargaining over the Regional Fund and over
other policy sectors" (Preston 1984, p84)
Thus, nature of the original RDF was largely determined by
national government representatives through the Council
machinery. That the Commission was able to influence the
agenda was important, but not decisive. This was reflected
by the fact that what emerged fell some way short of a
common regional policy and that control over the operation
over what emerged was placed firmly in the hands of national
governments.
Yet it could be argued that the development of a Community
regional policy of any kind by 1975, when so many factors
appeared to be working against it, was at least in part due
to the Commission's persistence, and in particular, that of
DG XVI. At the same time, it is more certain that acting
alone, the Commission's efforts would have been
insufficient: the intervention of the Irish and Italian
governments prior to the Paris Summit of 1974 was probably a
decisive moment. But the Commission did play an important
role in keeping the regional policy issue alive when some
member governments were indifferent and others would have
been happy to have seen it buried. In doing so, the
Commission at least provided an important ally for those
member governments continuing to promote a Community
regional policy.
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It may be said, therefore, that although member governments
through the Council structure possessed most of the
political and financial resources in the negotiations over
the creation of the RDF, the Commission was able to use,
both formally and informally, the political and
informational resources at its disposal to ensure a
continued profile for the issue. 	 The Commission recognised
the imbalance of resources in favour of national governments
and worked within the constraints this set. By keeping the
issue alive and establishing Commission involvement, Thomson
and his Commission allies had provided foundations on which
the Commission could seek to build in future.
2.2/4 The role of local and regional authorities
One of the striking aspects of the emergence of the Regional
Development Fund was that the representatives of regional
and local authorities played no part in Community level
discussions. This was despite the fact these were to be the
main implementors of the policy. While domestic
considerations were a feature of coordinating national
positions, and local authorities were consulted by national
governments, sub-central government was to play no
independent role in the creation of the regional fund. With
the Commission having to play a delicate political balancing
act, national governments largely shaped the implementation
process and were thus well placed to dominate the
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development of regional policy with the minimum of
interference from 'above' and 'below 1 . As Swift commented
in 1978:
"The national governments decide which projects
should go to Brussels, they form the committees
which decide which are accepted and they are
responsible for implementing the projects
assisted. They present the regional development
programmes and are responsible f or them, and can
exclude the regions from having any say on how the
policy should develop" (Swift 1978, p16)
2.2/5 The role of the European Parliament
In contrast to sub-national government, the European
Parliament was able to make a significant mark during the
emergence of the Fund. Following the Council decision to
establish the RDF in February 1975, the Parliament blocked
the release of the necessary funds by refusing to approve
the Supplementary Budget Regulation. By designating the
Fund's three-year endowment as 'obligatory' rather than
'non-obligatory' expenditure, the Council had effectively
ruled out any significant role in the process for
Parliament: only on the latter did it have effective ability
to amend. So although Parliament would be able to propose
changes to the regional fund budget, any amendments would
have to be supported by a qualified majority in Council,
leaving national governments in firm control.
Parliament argued that the R]JF endowment should be
classified non-obligatory because there was no provision in
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the original treaties for the RDF and its existence was thus
a discriminatory decision by the Council. Eventually, and
after considerable argument, Parliament, unsure of the legal
position of its argument, agreed to accept the RDF budget
proposal as it stood. However, it did not accept the
principle of RDF as obligatory expenditure. In taking this
position, Parliament reserved its right to return to the
issue at a future date,	 less the legal position be
clarified against it. Yet this dispute did demonstrate
Parliament's keenness to exercise some control over the
budgetary process and, by implication, some control over the
fund's effectiveness. Again, the main impact of the
Parliament's involvement at this stage was to put down a
marker for further involvement in future.
2.2/6 Additionality and the RDF
Although the Commission had accepted a limited role for
itself in the initial phase of regional policy, it still
hoped to exert influence over RDF expenditure in two ways:
through its limited discretion in approving applications and
through seeking to ensure additionality. The Commission's
effectiveness in the first of these areas would be
circumscribed by national governments not substantially
over-bidding and therefore restricting the Commission's
discretion over the types of projects funded.
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Securing the additionality of regional funds would have been
a major step towards a genuine supranational element in EC
regional policy. This was recognised by national
governments, not least the UK government, which was
determined consequently to avoid having its hands tied on
the matter. While the wording agreed in the original ERDF
regulations stated that,
"the Fund's assistance should not lead Member States to
reduce their own regional development efforts but
should complement these efforts" (Commission of the
European Communities 1975),
national governments found convenient ways of circumventing
this requirement, much to the frustration of the Commission.
The Commission accepted that in the initial phase of
regional policy, RDF receipts could be spent on projects
that had already been prepared in anticipation of domestic
funding. Initially therefore, additionality was defined by
the Commission in terms of increases to global national
expenditure on regional development and not necessarily by
specific projects being additional in the sense that they
would not otherwise have gone ahead. Many of them clearly
would have. The point was, however, that the total value of
projects developed in each member state would increase by an
amount equivalent to ERDF receipts. In the longer term, the
Commission wanted projects drawn up specifically for RDF
funding which would be distinct from and additional to
projects planned for domestic grant applications, but time
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constraints meant this was not practicable for the first
phase of RDF.
The early response of governments to the principle of
additionality was mixed: while the Irish and Italian
governments embraced the principle, the French only did so
in the first year because it coincided with domestic
priorities, and made this fact clear. The German
government, although initially reluctant, did embrace the
principle in November 1975. The UK government's response
was initially unclear because of inter-departmental
tensions, mainly between the Treasury and those 'spending'
ministries that expected to benefit directly from ERDF
receipts.
A major problem for the Commission in dealing with
recalcitrant governments over additionality emerged soon
after the Fund's creation. This was the problem of being
able to prove that regional fund receipts had not been spent
additionally when national governments claimed they had. As
one observer put it:
"even if the amount of total regional expenditure
remains constant in the year before Community aid
is received and in the first year in which it is,
a government can claim that, but for Community
help, their national regional expenditure would
have had to be reduced by an equivalent amount"
(Swift 1978, p16)
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However, the position of the UK government became clearer in
1976 when the Department of the Environment issued a
circular to local authorities on the use of RDF receipts:
tithe Government would not feel able to authorise
individual local authorities to undertake
additional projects because of the availability of
assistance from the Fund. The Government's
intention is that monies received from the Fund
should be passed to the authority responsible for
the project and used to reduce the amount that
authority might otherwise have to borrow. The
unused borrowing will not be available for other
schemes and the (borrowing) allocation of the
authority will be abated by the amount received
from the Fund" (DOE 1976, cited in Thomas 1992,
p295)
Thus, local authorities would not be able to increase their
total spending on economic development projects even if in
receipt of RDF grants. In short, RDF would not be spent
additionally in the UK's targeted regions. The only
possible benefit for local authorities receiving RDF and
thus the only possible 'additionality' was through savings
on interest payments to councils who would not have to
borrow as much money as they would otherwise. However,
there was no requirement that these interest savings, a
modest form of 'additionality', had to be spent on regional
development - they could just as easily be used to subsidise
other local authority expenditures:
"local authorities cannot therefore spend more,
but they have a cash resource which they may use
to reduce rates or to reduce the increase in
rates, that otherwise would be necessary to
service borrowing charges. It is not
additionality, it may be of benefit" (M.
MacLennan, House of Lords 1982 pp36-7, para.67)
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It was possible, however, that even this modest and non-
project additionality was denied UK local authorities:
"that additionality... may be expunged and removed
if even that cash element is eroded by a
compensating reduction in the rate support grant
because that extra cash is deemed to be an own
resource of the local authority" (M. MacLennan,
House of Lords 1982, p37, para.68)
The argument was that even additionality in the form of
interest savings could be denied by central government when
setting a local authority's rate support grant.
The Commission's problem of getting national governments to
accept additionality in principle and apply it in practice
continued to be a feature of ERDF in the years that followed
1975 and subsequent reforms were characterised by the
Commission's attempts to enhance its ability to act on this.
The next section considers the nature of the subsequent
reforms and the Commission's attempts to make progress on
the additionality issue in particular.
2.3 The Development of the ERDF 1975-1988
2.3/1 Introduction
In the period up to the reform of the Structural Funds in
1988, Community regional policy underwent reforms in 1979
and 1984, the history of which was:
"largely one of a struggle to throw off the many
restrictions imposed by the Council of Ministers in the
original 1975 Fund Regulation" (Armstrong 1989, p172)
The policy package which was introduced in 1975 and the RDF
in particular were subject to much criticism:
"The Fund was held to be too small and spread over
too wide an area of the Community (covering some
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60 of the geographical area and 40 of the
population) . The system of national quotas was
considered too rigid and, moreover, inadequately
related to the nature and seriousness of existing
d±sparities u
 (Mawson, Martins and Gibney 1985,
p30)
Moreover, it was becoming clear that the principle of
additionality was being interpreted as member states saw
fit, meaning in the British case that R]JF was seen as a form
of reimbursement for contributions to the Community budget.
The Commission appeared powerless to ensure that RDF was
spent additionally in targeted regions.
2.3/2 The 1979 reform
In June 1977, before the initial regional fund period
expired, the Commission sought to increase its influence by
proposing that a non-quota section for 'specific Community
measures' be introduced in the new regulations scheduled for
1979. This would target areas whose problems had been
exacerbated by the impact of Community membership, whether
these were within nationally delineated assisted areas or
not. For the most part, these would concentrate on regions
across member states suffering from the decline of the same
industry. Clearly, the Commission was seeking to break with
the rigidity of the national quota system and,
"make some modest movement towards the ERDF becoming a
development agency of a more genuine 'Community'
character rather than a somewhat limited subsidiser of
separate national policies" (Wise and Croxford 1988,
p175)
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Perhaps not suprisingly given the history of the regional
fund's creation, the Commission's non-quota proposal met.
with opposition within the Council. This was strongly
supported by the Netherlands but the French government
rejected the proposal outright as trying to give too much
power to the Commission to intervene in what it considered a
domestic policy area. The German government would support
the proposal only if the non-quota section was sufficiently
restricted and its uses tightly defined. But the Commission
was also seeking to define more broadly the types of schemes
that could be funded. Over these issues, the position of
national governments continued to reflect perceived national
interests:
"Once again the negotiations saw the net
benificieries, such as Britain and Italy, pushing
at the reluctant Germans to broaden the scope of
eligible activity, with only the smaller states,
such as the Netherlands arguing for a
strengthening of authority at Community level...
member states were applying the criteria of
national advantage applied to all Fund
negotiations. This suggested that the Commission's
intentions would be constrained as before"
(Preston 1984, p226 and p227)
Consequently, there would be little immediate change to the
legal and administrative framework which had guided the
operation of the Fund since 1975. However, the proposed
non-quota section was eventually accepted in June 1978,
although only at a maximum of 5 of ERDF and even this
amount was to be distributed subject to unanimous agreement
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in the Council, rather than by qualified majority voting as
proposed by the Commission.
The national quotas which had been established after
considerable negotiation in 1975 were not suprisingly left
largely unchanged when considered again in December 1977,
thus maintaining the political balance. The new allocations
were (previous figures bracketed)
Table 1: RJ)F national quotas agreed December 1977
Percentage ()
Eel g ium
Denmark
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
United Kingdom
1.39
1.20
16.86
6.00
6.46
39.39
0.09
1.58
27.03
(1.5)
(1.3)
(15.0)
(4.4)
(6.0)
(40.0)
(0.1)
(1.7)
(28.0)
(The biggest increase was awarded to France for its overseas
departments)
(Source: Preston 1984, p226)
During the same December Council it was agreed by the Heads
of Government that the regional fund would be allocated 1850
Mua for 1978-1980 (580 Mua for 1978, 620 for 1979 and 650
for 1980) . The European Parliament was dissatisfied with
these amounts and provoked another budgetary dispute with
the Council, although accepting the 1978 level rather than
risking no commitment at all for that year. Parliament was
in a stronger position this time around, with ERDF being
89
classified as non-obligatory expenditure from 1978 thus
giving Parliament more power over the allocations to the
regional fund.
The compromise which eventually emerged in March 1979
provided an allocation f or that year of 945 Mua - a
significant increase which signalled to the Council that the
Parliament should be consulted at an earlier stage in the
process if it wished to avoid future budgetary conflicts.
Yet it has been argued that this compromise did not
constitute the surrender of any real authority by the
Council to the Community institutions: the important point
was that, "the essential political bargain upon which the
Regional Fund was based... remained unchanged" (Preston
1984, p233)
Additionality and the 1979 reform
One important illustration of the continued member state
dominance of ERDF was the fact that the 1979 reform
contained no movement on the issue of additionality. This
was despite the efforts of the European Parliament, which
had been lobbied to push for changes by sub-national
authorities in regions denied additional resources by
national governments' interpretation of the principle. This
significant omission and the moderate content of the other
changes continued to stifle the development of a significant
relationship between sub-national authorities and the
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Commission in the regional policy sector and signified the
continued dominance of national governments.
From the Commission's perspective, probably the most
significant development stemming from the 1979 reform was
the use it made of non-quota aid, where its discretion was
greatest. Here the Commission pioneered the use of the
'programme contract' - a package of initiatives drawn up in
agreement with member states, specifically designed to
alleviate a clearly identified regional problem. The first
series of these programmes each focused on regions across
member states affected by the decline of a dominant industry
- steel, shipbuilding, textiles, fisheries. Non-quota
programmes were designed to develop new alternative economic
activity. A programme to assist development in border areas
provided the only non-sectoral variant. These programmes
were to prove important models for the Commission in shaping
its proposals for a further reform of regional policy.
Moreover, the Commission's influence over the non-quota
programmes and the greater visibility of the sectoral
programmes provided the Commission with potentially the
greatest opportunity for securing compliance with the
additionality principle.
2.3/3 The 1984 reform
The initial proposals
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There were two phases to the Commission's proposals for the
1984 reform, with the initial proposals of October 1981
being replaced by re-worked proposals in November 1983.
Again, the Commission's objective was to wrest some control
from national governments to make regional policy more
genuinely supranational.
Initially, the Commission's proposals for the 1984 involved
major changes including:
"the definition of rules for the coordination of
national regional policies; major changes in the
geographical distribution of assistance from the quota-
section of the ERDF and its methods of operations; a
significant expansion in the size of the quota-free
section of the Fund coupled with the regulation of the
concept of integrated development operations" (Martins,
Mawson and Gibney 1985, p38).
The Commission proposed that assistance from the quota
section should be distributed according to Community
criteria: aid would be restricted to regions with both a per
capita GDP and long-term unemployment rate of less than 75
on an index where the Community average was 100. This would
inevitably require substantial change to existing national
quotas, but, more importantly, it would also mean transfer
of significant responsibilities for allocating ERDF away
from national governments to the Commission.
The Commission also proposed that the existing arrangement
of financing individual projects should be gradually
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replaced by the financing of programme-contracts: "these
programmes were intended to be interrelated packages of
investment projects set within the context of an overall
regional development strategy based on a common format which
included objectives and a finance schedule for
implementation" (Mawson, Martins and Gibney 1985, p39).
The contracts would be f or a period of no less than three
years and would be agreed by the Commission and individual
member governments, in close consultation with local and
regional authorities and other implementing bodies. Once
programme funding had been agreed, the Commission proposed
passing on grants directly to the authority or agency
responsible for implementation. The transition to the
programme approach would take three years to complete,
eventually covering all quota section applications.
The political implications of the Commission's proposals
were clear: the role of national government's would be
downgraded and the programme approach in particular would
present new opportunities for the Commission to develop
links with local and regional authorities in administering
the Fund. The Commission's role would be further enhanced
by the proposed increase in the non-quota section from 5 to
2O to assist regions affected by serious problems from
recent industrial decline or by the direct effect of
Community policies.	 In addition, the Commission proposed
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that decisions on which measures would be undertaken would
be made by the Fund Management Committee and not by the
existing method of a unanimous vote in the Council. Not
suprisingly, this ambitious package provoked a hostile
reaction from member governments and led to a period of
sustained negotiations at Community level.
Almost two years after the Commission's proposals had first
been announced, there was little sign of a consensus
emerging between the Commission and national governments.
Eventually, the Commission accepted that little headway
would be made with the proposals as they stood and so
revised them. The two related issues blocking agreement
were the proposals to target assistance to the Community's
most disadvantaged regions through a more flexible system,
thus meaning that a number of national quotas - those of
Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands - would be
reduced; and the increase in the non-quota section to 20%.
Ultimately, national governments did not want to cede this
much control over regional policy to the Commission.
Despite enthusiasm for these proposals from sub-national
actors in the UK and also from the Department of Industry
(House of Lords 1982, pxii, para. 20), the government
position opposed the changes on the grounds that the UK
share of receipts might fall:
"It argues that the discretion attaching to the
allocation of funds from such a large non-quota section
could result in the UK receiving a smaller share of the
94
ERDF than it might expect" (House of Lords 1982, pxij,
para.20)
As a consequence of the stalemate the Commissioner for
Regional Policy, Antonio Giolitti, set about revising the
proposals to make them more acceptable to national
governments.
The revised proposals
The revised proposals contained two main changes. The first
would abolish the distinction between quota and non-quota
funding and replace it with a system of 'quantitative
guidelines' which would provide each member state with a
flexible ERDF allocation, constrained by upper and lower
limits. This would still allow the Commission greater
control over allocations but was intended to reassure member
states over the sums they would receive. The second change
proposed using the programme approach for all PJJF funding,
retaining a distinction between Community programmes and
national programmes.
Community programmes, to be drawn up by the Commission in
consultation with member states, would be similar to
previous non-quota initiatives. Significantly, these
programmes would be instigated on Commission initiative to
'directly serve Community objectives' and would as a rule
'concern the territory of more than one state' . 	 The
national programmes would be drawn up by member governments
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in consultation with sub-national authorities and would be
limited to nationally designated assisted areas.	 These
would, however, have to be programmes of 'Community
interest': that is, be consistent with Community regional
development objectives. Both these and national programmes
would be required to set out clearly both objectives and
anticipated results.
When the Council finally voted to accept the replacement of
the rigid quota system, it was with the important
qualification that the percentage ranges proposed would not
be indicative as the Commission had wanted, but that the
lower limit would constitute the minimum amount of ERDF
resources guaranteed to member states, conditional on
sufficient satisfactory applications being made within the
required time period. Additionally, the lower limits were
set above those proposed by the Commission, leaving only
11.37% to be allocated with Commission discretion (See Table
1). This increase in the Commission's allocation of the
regional fund was, in other words,
"a very modest increase, especially if one takes
into account the fact that even under the existing
system the quotas were flexible: when a member
state failed to submit a sufficient number of
acceptable projects to exhaust its share in the
Fund (which happened regularly), the surplus was
transferred to the other States" (IDe Witte 1986,
p425)
However, the agreement that the frameworks for Community
programmes would be decided in Council by a qualified
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majority rather than unanimity was seen as an progress by
the Commission.
Table 2: Distribution of ERDF among the States (1985)
Member State	 Lower Limit % Upper Limit %
Belgium
Denrna rk
Germany
Greece
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Holland
United Kingdom
0 .90
0.51
3.76
12.35
11. 05
5 . 64
31.94
0.06
1.00
21.42
1.20
0 . 67
4.81
15 . 74
14 . 74
6 . 83
42.59
0.08
1.34
28.56
(Source: De Witte 1986, p425)
That the Council agreed to accept the national programme
approach was also seen by the Commission as a step forward,
although again the Commission's proposals had been
significantly diluted. The Council had agreed that the
programmes would only account for 20 of the total regional
fund by the end of the third year rather than the 40 the
Commission initially wanted. The Council had also insisted
that the programme approach would only be introduced on a
'trial basis'
In addition to diluting the national programme approach,
Community programmes were not to be drawn up by the
Commission as it proposed, but by 'the competent authorities
of the member state or state's concerned in consultation
with the Commission'. 	 In short, this meant national
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governments retained control of this process. The Council
also limited the allocations to Community programmes to a
maximum of less than l2. The 1984 outcome, like that of
the previous reform negotiations, turned out to be more of
review than the substantial reform the Commission had
wanted, particularly as:
"Community programmes which were the main supranational
element of the review, appear to have been hijacked by
member states" (Mawson, Martins and Gibney 1985, p56)
Despite the considerable dilution of Commission proposals,
the 1984 changes were viewed as a "modest move towards the
EPDF becoming an agent of regional development more
influenced by Community perspectives" (Wise and Croxford
1988, p175) . In particular, the introduction of minimum and
maximum allocations meant that the Commission had a little
more discretion over grant allocations. The programme
approach, as discussed above, seemed to give the Commission
a number of advantages. In particular, it seemed the
programme approach would make it more difficult "f or
governments to use ERDF finance to subsidize their own
efforts rather than augment them; and, by stressing the need
to co-ordinate regional investment, the programme system
would aim to tailor national policies to conform more
closely with Community priorities" (Pinder 1983, p109) . The
programme approach, were it to have this effect, would
clearly enhance the Commission's position relative to
national governments.
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4.8
5.6
4.9
4.6
6.1
6.7
7.3
7.6
7.6
7.3
7.5
9.1
257.6*
3943*
378.5*
581.0
945 . 0
1165 .0
1540 . 0
1759 .5
2010 .0
2140 . 0
2289.0
3176 . 5
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
198 1* *
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986***
Notes:
With regard to the ERDF's endowment, again, the reforms
brought an increase but the fund remained, "far too small to
make a significant contribution to redressing the regional
imbalances within the common market" (Wise and Croxford
1988, p180)
Table 3 Changes in the absolute and relative size of the
ERDF 1975-1985
Year
	 Size of Fund	 Percentage of EC Budget
* Converted into ECU at January 1986 rate. The ECU replaced
the Eua in 1979 as part of the European Monetary System
(EMS)
** Greece joins the Community.
*** Spain and Portugal join the Community.
(Source: Commission of the European Communities 1986,
reproduced in Wise and Croxford 1988, p163)
Additionality and the 1984 reform
The 1984 reform brought no significant movement on the issue
of additionality save for the limited changes that might
develop from the national programme approach and from the
increase in what was effectively the new non-quota section
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of ERDF. The Commission hoped that through increasing its
involvement through these measures it would be better placed
to secure additionality. However, in relation to national
progranirnes, it was said as early as 1985 that:
"attempts to secure additionality through the
identification of EC measures within RDPs (Regional
Development Plans) and regional programmes can easily
be overridden if member states so choose" (Mawson et al
1985, p56)
It was also less than clear that additionality had been
implemented for the programmes introduced under the previous
non-quota section, despite the Commission belief that
assistance from these would be more transparent and thus
non-implementation of additionality easier to prove.
In its initial proposals for the 1984 reform submitted in
1981, the Commission had attempted to tighten the
additionality requirement by inserting new wording in the
regional fund regulations. Even at this point, the
Commission was dissatisfied with at least the UK
government's implementation of additionality. While the
government claimed it met the additionality requirements,
the lack of transparency in its system for allocating ERDF
in the UK meant the argument was impossible to prove or
disprove.	 The Department of Industry outlined the
government's position to the House of Lords in 1980:
"Although Fund receipts for individual projects
are retained by the Government, they are taken
into account in determining the levels of national
regional assistance which would be lower without
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the Fund receiptslt (House of Lords 1981, p7,
para.31)
While this explanation appeared reasonable in terms of extra
resources being provided, conflicting information from local
authorities and the UK government itself (DoE 1976, above)
left the Commission unconvinced. While the government
appeared to have changed its position from the DoE circular
in 1976, it had not changed its implementation arrangements.
Despite this, Commission proposals to amend the regulation
covering additionality in the 1984 reform was blocked by the
Council: no change in the additionality wording meant no new
requirement for national governments to demonstrate
additionality.
The UK government and additionality
If the Commission could claim that it had increased its role
over regional policy in the decade or so after the
introduction of the regional fund, it would also recognise
that this progress fell short of its ambitions. National
government interests conflicted with those of the Commission
in two important ways. First, member states wanted to
maximise their regional fund receipts; and second, they
wanted to decide how to spend them. Where Community
regional policy objectives loosely coincided with those of
national governments there was no real problem relating to
additionality; but where national priorities conflicted with
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the additionality requirement, it was not fulfilled 	 This
certainly appeared to be the case with the UK.
Throughout the period considered so far, the UK government's
approach had been shaped by two related factors. The main
concern was the Treasury view that public expenditure should
be tightly controlled and RDF spending should be
accommodated within Treasury limits. Related to this was
the concern that concessions leading to a more effective EC
regional policy would lead to a corresponding and
undesirable increase in the Commission's authority to
influence public expenditure levels in the UK. Thus, the
main concerns of the UK government, and others, were
domestic. Which, as one commentator suggested, was quite
understandable:
"It would be politically irrational for them to
operate in any other way, given that their power
ultimately depends on national institutions,
electorates and interest groups" (Wise and
Croxford 1988, p172)
A third, but less immediate concern for the UK government
was the possibility of sub-national authorities securing
greater autonomy as a consequence of EC regional policy.
This concern meant that despite EC-level agreement in the
1984	 reform	 negotiations	 to	 consult	 sub-national
authorities, the UK government, "proved reluctant to allow
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local authorities much say in the preparation of the non-
quota programmes. . ." (Mawson et al 1985, p49)
On the crucial matter of additionality, the UK government
appeared to have found a way of expressing acceptance to it
in principle but effectively denying it in practice. There
was, however, one important instance where an exception was
made which seemed to prove the rule. Here, the Community
provided a special programme for housing development in
Belfast. The EC's financial commitment to this programme
was announced in 1980 after the UK government had decided on
its public expenditure plans for the year ahead. This
presented the government with a situation in which it could
not feasibly claim that it accommodated this expenditure in
the sums calculated. In its attempt to ensure additionality
over the three year period of the programme,
"the Commission stated that the UK share of the
expenditure should not decline in value from the 1981
level and that the special programme should show the
number of additional new houses to be built annually
through Community aid" (Martins and Mawson 1983, p74).
In this particular case, additionality was demonstrated:
"the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced that
he intended to increase expenditure on housing in the
province by some £50 million above the projected level in
the previous year's White Paper" (Martins and Mawson 1983,
p74). However, this was an exception, as a government
spokesman acknowledged:
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"This was an entirely different situation. Here,
the Commission came along and said: "We have this
kind of money available which we are proposing to
divert to the United Kingdom to finance housing in
Belfast". This was a grant which the Government
could not have foreseen. Until the Commission
came to offer it, we did not know it existed.
Under the circumstances, and provided the money is
paid in way enabling us to spend it in later
years, not the year in which it is paid - because
housing programmes take time - then some kind of
additionality is possible" 	 (J G Walmsley,
Assistant Secretary, in House of Lords 1982, p5,
para. 11)
The obvious inference in this statement was that unless
circumstances were exceptional, the government would not
feel obliged to demonstrate additionality. This response
reinforced suspicions that under normal circumstances,
additionality was denied.
This Belfast housing programme is an important example for
this research because of the parallels between it and the
RECHA.R programme which is an important case study in this
research. For reasons connected with additionality, RECHAR
was also announced after UK public expenditure programmes
had been drawn up for the programme period. However, with
the RECHAR programme, the UK government's first response was
to make no exception to its implementation arrangements.
2.4 Conclusion
Prior to the reform of the structural funds in 1988, the
consensus of opinion was that national governments had
104
retained control over the key aspects of regional policy-
making. Keating and Jones (1985, p54) concluded that:
I! Whjle the persistence of severe regional problems in
certain member states, allied with the political
pressures for economic and monetary union and
enlargement of the Community have kept up the momentum
for development of the CRP (Community Regional Policy),
progress had nevertheless been marred by national
control over all the major aspects of the policy. . ."
Preston (1984, p83) argued that the in its attempts to
develop a genuine Community regional policy, the Commission
faced a recurring problem:
"The Fund negotiations show clearly how the concept of
national interest works strongly against the
development of Community policies. The declaration by
any member state that a particular Commission proposal
is against its national interest has a multiplier
effect. .
Yet the struggle over regional policy between the Commission
and national governments was not considered unusual by
commentators at the time, but was seen as:
!Ia familiar tussle between the member governments
and the Commission over whose influence should
predominate: the encapsulation of crucial stages
of decision in the Council of Ministers and
frequently their adjudication by the European
Council..." (H Wallace 1983, p96)
Where the Commission made progress, it did so through its
agenda-setting powers. While national governments rejected
and diluted many of the Cominissionts proposals for regional
policy from the 1960s through to the early 1980s, it was
significant that national governments were usually reacting
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to an agenda set by the Commission. While national
governments retained control over the broad principles of
policy, when it came to detail, the Commission provided much
of the information. Consequently, the Council was choosing
between options usually put to it by the Commission and some
Commission preferences were adopted.
	 The creation and
development of both the non-quota system and the programme-
contracts were examples of this. The Commission had the
expertise and information to prepare solid arguments for
these, and sometimes tentatively, the Council accepted them.
Thus, up to the 1988 reform of the structural funds, the
Commission, at times assisted by the European Parliament,
made piecemeal progress by seeking to, "educate and cajole
governments at the margins rather than to promote immediate
and radical changes in national regional policies" (H
Wallace 1983, p97) . Yet advances for the Commission
depended on sufficient national governments accepting its
arguments, which in many instances did not happen.
Additionality was an important example of this and the
Commission's failure to make progress on this key principle,
was an illustration of the Council's resilience on matters
of 'high policy' to national governments.
If the Commission's influence over the early development of
regional policy could be described as significant in some
areas, but severely constrained in others, the direct
106
influence of sub-national authorities and other interests on
Community level decision-making would have to be considered
negligible. As Helen Wallace suggested, the history of
regional policy up to the early 1980s could not in any way
'vindicate the approach of the functionalist or neo-
functionalist' (1983, p97) . The consequence of national
government domination was the failure of the Commission to
establish a regional fund with the redistributive effects it
desired. The reform of the structural funds in 1988 would
provide another opportunity for the Commission to secure its
objective. Up to that point, however, the consensus was
that:
"Little has yet happened to disprove that the Fund is
essentially tcosmeticl and conceals the lack of a
genuine desire among member states to adopt
interventionist policies at a Community level capable
of reducing spatial inequalities in wealth" (Wise and
Croxford 1988, p187)
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3. The 1988 reform of the structural funds
3.1 Context
Two important developments provide the context of the reform
of the structural funds which came into effect on January 1,
1989: the enlargement of the Community to include Portugal
and Spain and the push towards greater economic and social
cohesion given expression in the Single European Act (SEA)
of 1986.
Enlargement
The most significant implication for regional policy of the
accession of Spain and Portugal was the considerable
widening of regional disparities in the EU, leading to "a
doubling of the population of the least favoured regions
(those with per capita GDP of less than 50% of the Community
average)" (Commission 1989, p9) . This in itself required an
expansion of regional policy. However, the accession of
Spain and Portugal was also important in prompting the
introduction of a new type of programme, the Integrated
Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs)
Hooghe (1996) points to the creation of the IMPs as
important forerunners for the reform package of 1988. The
IMPs were introduced as a side payment to Greece which had
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threatened to veto the accession of Spain and Portugal. An
important feature of the IMPs was that they "advocated
continuing involvement of the Commission in all aspects of
programming and aimed to mobilise 'non-central' actors"
(Hooghe 1996, p11) . The IMPs were drafted by a small unit
attached to the Commission Presidency which was later
upgraded to DG XVII and as such was central to drawing up
the 1988 structural fund regulations.
Expansion of the EU had previously been a factor in shaping
regional policy. As noted earlier, impetus for the creation
of the original regional fund in 1975 owed much to British
membership. In the mid-1980s, however, expansion was
accompanied by the most determined push for the completion
of the common market in the Community's history. Together,
these factors provided the unique context of the 1988 reform
of the structural funds.
The push for completion of the internal market
The fact that the economies of the US and Japan were
outpacing the bulk of Community economies in the late l970s
and l980s initially provoked the response of greater
national protectionism from some member states. So much so
that the European Economic Community was pronounced
'moribund' in 1982 (see Keohane and Hoffman 1991, p1). Soon
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after, however, the general focus of member states was on
the Community's need to achieve a genuine common market if
the relative poor performance of EC economies was to
improve. In this sense, the drive for the completion of the
internal market,
"resulted less from a coherent burst of idealism than
from a convergence of national interest around a new
pattern of economic policymaking" (Keohane and Hoffman
1991, pp23-24)
It was in this context that the newly-appointed Commission
of 1985 prioritised the development of proposals to promote
a new phase of European integration.
The outcome of the Commission's deliberations was its White
Paper of 1985 on "Completing the Internal Market" which led
to the SEA. This set out almost 300 legislative proposals
with timetables for approval and enactment by the end of
1992 with the objective of removing all existing physical,
technical and fiscal barriers to the movement of goods and
individuals within the Community by 1992.
	 The impetus
given to the EU by the SEA,
"served to alert the poorer regions of the Community
that the completion of the internal market could lead
to a concentration of wealth in the EC's core
economies" (McAleavey 1993, p92)
The necessary restructuring which would take place led to
talk of 'Golden Triangle' connecting prosperous parts of the
Community which would benefit from the single market. The
implication was that the regions outside this would face a
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downward economic spiral in the absence of an effective
Community regional policy.
\In response to the concerns of the Community's poorer
regions, the SEA explicitly stated the need to strengthen
the Community's economic and social cohesion in particular
through attempting to reduce regional disparities:
"One provision essential to the passage of the internal
market programme was the expansion of structural funds
aimed at poorer regions of the EC. This provision,
referred to as the "convergence policy" was not a vital
element of economic liberalization, as the Commission
at times claimed, but was instead a side-payment to
Ireland and the Southern nations in exchange for their
political support... (Moravscik 1991, p62)
Specifically, Article 130A of the SEA stated:
"In order to promote its overall harmonious
development, the Community shall develop and pursue
its actions leading to the strengthening of its
economic and social cohesion.
"In particular the Community shall aim at reducing
disparities between the various regions and the
backwardness of the least-favoured regions" (Commission
1989, p11)
Article 130D of the SEA called for a reform of the
structural funds,
"particularly through a framework regulation on the
tasks of the structural Funds and their effectiveness
and on coordination of their activities between
themselves and with the operations of the ElE and other
financial instruments" (Commission 1989, p11)
The Commission commented that in providing for this, the
SEA:
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"clearly establishes the principle, hitherto implicit
in the EEC Treaty of solidarity between states... It
requires not only increasing convergence of Member
States economic policies but also a reduction in
regional disparities" (Commission 1989, p11)
The Commission was charged with the task of presenting to
the Council a comprehensive proposal on the reform of the
structural funds. To facilitate this process, the
Commission issued policy guidelines in February 1987, as
part of its broader policy document "Making a Success of the
Single Act - A new Frontier for Europe", (also known as the
'Delors' Plan' after the President of the European
Commission) . This formed the basis for legislation to
improve the coordination of the previously separate ERDF,
ESF and EAGGF.
3.2 The Principles Underlying the 1988 Reform
The Commission stated that, "the crucial principles which
should in future govern the Community's structural action
are greater economic realism in what the Community does and
improved coordination with national policies, leaving
maximum scope for decentralized measures" (Commission 1988,
p13). This general statement of principle was broken down
into five 'complementary' principles:
- concentration of the funds on the areas of greatest
need as defined by the accompanying objectives (see
below)
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- progra.mming: multi-project programmes would replace
the submission of individual projects to ease the
Commissionts administrative burden and promote a more
coherent approach;
- coordination of the scructural funds both with other
EU funds and domestic regional initiatives;
- partnership: partnerships would be established to
oversee the administration of the funds and would
require the formal involvement of sub-national
authorities;
- additionality: the additionality requirement would
be strengthened by a new regulation and by the greater
involvement of sub-national authorities and the
Commission in the new partnership arrangements.
Expenditure was to be concentrated on the five objectives:
Objective 1 - promoting the development of less
developed regions (ERDF, ESF and EAGGF (Guidance
Section))
Objective 2 - converting the regions seriously affected
by industrial decline (ERDF, ESF)
	 -
Objective 3 - combating long-term unemployment (ESF)
Objective 4 - assisting the occupational integration of
people below the age of 25 (ESF)
Objective 5 - (a) speeding up the adjustment of
agricultural structures (EAGGF) (Guidance Section));
(b) promoting the development of rural areas (EAGGF
(Guidance), ESF, ERDF)
Funds were to be allocated through a three-stage approach.
First, after full consultation with sub-national
authorities, national governments would submit regional
development plans to the Commission. Second, the Commission
would incorporate national views in Community Support
Frameworks (CSFs) drawn up by partnerships which would
prioritise spending areas and provide a financial plan.
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Third, detailed operational programmes would be agreed by
the partners who would then implement the objectives of the
CSFs.
In addition to the 'mainstream' structural funds allocated
according to the five objectives, approximately 9 of the
ERDF budget was retained for 'Community Initiatives'. These
were programmes devised by the Commission to meet
outstanding regional needs. As with the non-quota
programmes that had preceded these, such as RESIDER (steel
areas) and RENAVAL (shipping and shipbuilding areas),
Community Initiative programmes would usually address the
needs of regions suffering from the decline of a particular
industry.
Additionality
As a key principle of the 1988 reform of the structural
funds, the Commission was eager to secure the most precise
requirement that member states should treat the structural
funds as additional. The final wording on additionality
stated:
"In establishing and implementing the Community Support
Frameworks the Commission and the member states shall
ensure that the increase in the appropriations for the
(structural) funds... has a genuine additional impact
in the regions concerned and results in at least an
equivalent increase in the total volume of official or
similar (Community and national) structural aid in the
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member states concerned, taking into account the macro-
economic circumstances.. ." (Article 9, Regulation
253/88 EEC)
As McAleavey points out:
The reference to Community Support Frameworks (CSFs)
is significant as it was a widely held view that the
shift to a programme approach would help the Commission
in its attempts to ensure additionality" (McAleavey
1993, p96)
Each CSF document subsequently included the following
reference to the additionality regulation in Article 9:
"By agreeing to this Community Support Framework, the
Member State also confirms its commitment to this legal
obligation. The Commission will check the application
of this commitment on a regular basis by undertaking a
periodic assessment of	 additionality throughout the
period of implementation of the Community Support
Framework" (Community Support Framework for Northern
Ireland, 1989-93 cited in NIERC 1992, p62)
3.3 The UK government's position
The UK government was opposed to several aspects of the
proposed reform of the structural funds. With regard to the
proposal to double the funds by 1992, Mrs Thatcher commented
in December 1987:
"In common with several other heads of state I made it
clear that this was out of the question. Our view is
that growth of these funds must be contained within a
strict framework of budgetary discipline, but that it
would be right to concentrate a proportion of them on
the less prosperous member states, particularly Spain
and Portugal" (House of Commons, 8/12/87)
The UK was not alone among the larger member states in
seeking to limit the increase in the funds allocations.
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That the fund was ultimately doubled owed much to the
commitment of larger member states to the single market
programme. As Gary Marks argued:
"The most straightforward explanation for the growth of
the structural funds is that they are a side payment or
bribe paid by the wealthier members to the poorer
peripheral members of the EC in return for their assent
to the 1992 package of economic liberalization" (1992,
p194)
Although the funds would continue to benefit regions in the
more prosperous member states, the main impact of the
doubling of the funds would be to transfer resources from
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France and the Netherlands to
Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal with the impact
on the UK largely neutral (Marks 1992, p194) . The shift in
EU resources to the structural funds has been seen as an
illustration of "forced spillover in which the prospect of a
breakthrough in one arena created intense pressure for
innovation in another" (Marks 1992, p198)
Although Marks (1992, p199) points out that the "view that
economic liberalization will hurt the weaker economies in
the EC is contested" the side payments argument still
appears to be the most suitable explanation for member
states agreeing to pay more into the structural funds
without receiving a greater return. However, while the
matter of doubling the funds to compensate the poorer member
states for the single market problem was not ultimately a
stumbling block in the negotiations, other aspects of the
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proposed reform proved more contentious. No issue was more
fiercely contested by the UK government than additionality.
As one UK civil servant put it:
"Towards the end of the negotiations different member
states had different reservations. There were a number
of areas of concern. Ours was additionality" (DTI
official, 1995)
The UK goverrunent and the additionality principle
There were two parts to the 1988 structural fund
negotiations. The main (framework) regulation was dealt
with in the first part of the year and signed in June 1988.
However, the additionality requirement appeared in the
coordination regulation. The negotiations over this began
in September 1988. Interviewees for this research placed
different emphasis on the importance the UK government
attached to the additionality principle at least in the
early stages of the negotiations:
"Additionality was a very small part of the
discussions. The whole concept of the structural funds
was changing. We were negotiating four regulations at
the same time, one coordinating regulation and three
fund regulations. Everything did not revolve around
additionality but we did need to know what it meant"
(DTI official, 1995)
"Additionality was one of the sticking points,
particularly with the UK. We thought we were getting
victimised" (DOE official, 1995)
"Additionality was the biggest problem for the UK
government. The framework regulation had been approved
in June 1988. The government opposed the coordination
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regulation in December 1988 because the additionality
regulation appeared in this. The government blocked
agreement on the whole package because of
additionality" (Commission official, 1995)
Despite these differences of emphasis, the UK government
made it clear during the negotiations that it saw the final
wording on additionality as an important part of the deal.
As the DTI official (1995) quoted above also commented,
"...from the UK's point of view the additionality issue was
the last one to be settled".
The Commission suggested that the UK had a unique dual
strategy for limiting the impact in the UK of a strengthened
additionality requirement:
"During the negotiations the UK government saw the way
additionality was going and as an 'insurance policy'
did two things. One was to dilute the wording in the
regulation so that it referred to additionality for
'increases in the appropriations of the structural
funds'. The other was to ensure that the UK did not
appear to benefit from such increases in the
appropriations by maximising their structural fund
receipts in 1988. So in parallel with pushing for
changes to the wording the government submitted
programmes in 1987-88 which amounted to a very large
sum of money" (Commission official, 1995)
At the end of 1987 and the beginning of 1988 the government
submitted large programme bids for the steel areas of
Yorkshire and Humberside, South Wales and Strathclyde.
Other major programmes submitted were for the Mersey Basin
and Birmingham. It was suggested that:
"The financial allocation that these programmes
represented bore no relationship to the needs of the
region or per head of population. The Strathclyde
programme, for example, was worth ECU 350m. It was the
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biggest programme ever submitted and out of proportion
to the needs of the region. It was simply part of a
strategy to maximise the receipts from the Commission
for 1988U (Commission official, 1995)
The intention of this strategy was to ensure that the UK
would receive large amounts of structural fund money in
1988, thus ensuring that receipts for the following year
would be lower. This would allow the government to claim
that as it did not benefit from the increase in the
appropriations resulting from the doubling of the funds it
would not have to change its arrangements to prove
additionality.
For its part, the government did not deny its role in
ensuring the phrase 'increase in the appropriations' was
inserted into the regulation:
"We had that put in. We felt we would get less after
the reform and therefore we would be able to get round
Article 9" (DOE official, 1995)
However there was a difference of opinion within government
about the importance of the programmes submitted by the UK
before the negotiations were concluded. One official
suggested that the UK was not alone in doing this, although
he acknowledged that,
"it is true that if those programmes had not been
signed we would have had big problems" (DOE official,
1995)
Another pointed out that,
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u the Commission did approve some programmes in 1988 but
it was in December, so these were not paid until 1989"
(DTI official, 1995)
A Commission official commented that,
"there was a UK government strategy of peaking its
structural fund receipts in 1988. No other member
state did this to the same extent. The timing was
crucial because the day after such approvals are made a
payment is made from the Commission to the member state
equal to half of the first year's balance. 	 Being
aware of this, the government put a lot of the spending
commitments f or the programmes into the first year"
(Commission official, 1995)
The programmes submitted by the UK were eventually approved
in December 1988:
"To get these programmes through the government put
tremendous pressure on the Commission. The regulations
stipulated a time limit for the approval of these
programmes which the Commission had to work within and
there was also enormous political pressure placed on
Jacques Delors who at the time was trying to get a
number of things through including 'Financial
Perspectives', a move to multi-annual planning for the
Commission. In the end it was Delors' responsibility
for the programmes going through" (Commission official,
1995)
While other member states had reservations about
additionality, only the 15K held out on the principle after
it had agreed to everything else. Ultimately it agreed to
the new regulation with the insertion of the clause
"increase in the appropriations" when it became clear that
the Commission would approve the programmes it had
submitted:
"In the end it became a numbers game. After the
programmes had been approved the government knew it
wouldn't have to do anything new. One Mecu of
difference would have required them to show
additionality (Commission official, 1995)
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For the government, the objective was clearly to get what it
considered to be the best deal possible from the reform of
the structural funds without jeopardising the single market
programme:
"At the end of the day we had to do a deal. It was a
bit of horse trading. That is how the Community works
(DTI official, 1995)
Why additionality was so important to the UK in particular
Perhaps not surprisingly, different views were offered to
explain why the UK was ultimately alone in holding up
agreement on the reform of the structural funds because of
additionality. One view was that additionality was only a
problem for the UK because it was particularly targeted by
the Commission:
"Each member state deals with additionality
differently. The Commission says that the UK in
particular is a problem. The UK says that it has a
unique system to work within... In some member states
you would be hard put to see that additionality
exists"	 (DTI official 1995)
Or, put another way:
"The difference is that we play cricket. When we say
we are going to do something we do it, others don't.
Additionality had not been enforced elsewhere" (DOE
official, 1995)
The same DOE official suggested that the UK government was
put under greater pressure because Commissioner Millan had a
domestic UK agenda:
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"In 1988 we had this massive Article 9. I saw it as
the end of the road. The ex-socialist minister was
getting tough...	 Mr Millan was making political
capital... He was using his position to influence
domestic policies" (DOE official, 1995)
Another suggestion which would seem to have merit is that
additionality coincided more with the policies of other
national governments:
"In some states it fitted in with what they were doing.
They have different public expenditure systems (DOE
official, 1995)
This view was also expressed by the Commission:
"Other member states were carrying out their own
regional policies and additionality coincided more with
their efforts. There were no problems, for example,
with Greece and Portugal. There had been problems with
Italy. This was essentially the result of internal
North-South conflict. The bulk of structural fund
money for Italy went to the South and some people in
the government were against that. But only in the UK
did additionality clearly conflict with national
policies" (Commission official, 1995)
It was also the case that during the 1988 negotiations,
other member states had other priorities:
"Some were more concerned with the amounts they would
receive. In the southern member states structural
funds are a much higher proportion of public spending
than in the UK. They can amount to something like 2-3
of GDP. In the UK the overall amounts are much less
significant (DTI official, 1995)".
3.4 The outcome of the negotiations
At the end of the 1988 negotiations it was clear that the
outcome had required compromise on the part of the national
governments and the Commission. For the UK government's
123
part, it lost the argument about the amounts to be allocated
to ti'e funds but had apparently secured its objective of
circumventing any new requirement to prove additionality.
The funds' allocation would double in real terms between
1987 and 1993 with allocations in the final year of this
period up to ECU 14 billion, approximately 25 of the EU
budget. This contrasted starkly with the initial allocation
of ECU 257.6m in 1975 which represented 4.8 of total EC
spending and the 1987 allocation of ECU 3,311 (9.l&) (Marks
1992, p194) . However, in losing this argument the UK
government was compensated by the belief that it would be
under no new obligation to demonstrate additionality,
despite the Commission's efforts to make this a key
principle of the reform.
The negotiations reflected the continued importance of
national governments in EU-level regional policy making:
agreements were made largely through trade-off S between
member states. However, the Commission's role in the 1988
negotiations was also important. While it depended on the
support of member states to secure changes, its ability to
shape the agenda by framing detailed and coherent proposals
made securing support that much easier. Significantly, the
Commission's proposals were given legitimacy by the earlier
adoption of the single market by member states which, as a
corollary, implied a more significant role for EU regional
policy. Consequently, the inclusion of the partnership
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principle, the introduction of programmes and the change to
the additionality requirement were all Commission driven.
Thus, coming at a high point of EU integration, the
negotiations over the reform of the structural funds in 1988
allowed the Commission to advance its objective of a genuine
regional policy. It engaged, as the terminology puts it, in
'active policy making 1 . The Commission sought to make a
great leap forward towards a genuine regional policy and
even if it did not secure all of its policy objectives in
the negotiations, it was generally recognised to have made
progress in that direction. However, securing changes in
principle was one thing, while seeing them implemented could
be quite another. In particular, the additionality
principle was contested by the UK government and at the end
of 1988 it was unclear whether this would be observed.
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Chapter four: The RECHAR dispute
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4.1 Background
4.1/1 Local authorities and additionality before 1988
Central government departments apart, in the period prior to
the 1988 reform of the structural funds, local authorities
were the major regional policy actors in the UK. However,
despite a variety of channels through which local authority
views on additionality were expressed, these views had
little influence over the government's position in the
negotiations over the 1988 reform. Given that the 1980s in
particular marked a period of tension and at times hostility
in UK central-local relations, this was no real surprise.
The main formal channel of consultation between central and
local government prior to 1988 was the European Joint Group
(EJG). The EJG was chaired by the DOE and brought together
the local authority associations and the central government
departments concerned to discuss the broad range of EC
matters of interest to local government. It met on a
quarterly basis and provided a two-way channel of
communication: to inform local authorities of relevant
developments and to provide central government with
information about potential problems arising from EC
policies. This forum also provided local authorities with
the opportunity to put forward ideas for policy change at EU
level.
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In addition to the EJG, local authorities regularly
contributed to Parliamentary committee hearings on EC
affairs. The most influential of these committees was the
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities,
which regularly received evidence from local government
representatives. While the final reports of these
committees were often critical of the government's position
on additionality, they did little to change policy. A
number of other lobbying channels were used by local
government - MPs, functional consultative committees and
direct contact with individual ministries - but these
channels were equally fruitless on the issue of
additionality.
Despite the various channels of representation for local
authorities there was no discrete local authority grouping
focusing on additionality, although the European section of
the Local Government International Bureau (LGIB), became
increasingly specialised on the issue. But representations
made by the LGIB and other additionality specialists, for
example within the AMA, were made through the broad channels
of representation available for the range of issues covering
local government. Over time, the value of these channels
fluctuated but even at relative 'high points' of local
government influence in the national networks, influence was
limited and tenuous.
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The 1970s
In the 1970s, regular consultation with local government was
a feature of the corporatist trend in British government.
The national associations were recognised by central
government as 'peak associations' with a legitimate role to
play in decision making. The creation of the Consultative
Council on Local Government Finance (CCLGF) by the Labour
Government was an illustration of this. The CCLGF provided
for the first time a formal channel through which local
government representatives and government ministers would
meet regularly to discuss local government spending in the
wider context of national public expenditure. Central
government's objective was to illustrate to local government
the 'realities' of the restrictive economic environment in
which decisions had to be made. Through incorporating local
government in this way, central government hoped it would be
able to make the cuts to public spending it wanted with a
degree of consensus, thus smoothing the implementation
process.
However, two features of this period served to outline the
limits of local government influence within the new
corporatist channels. First, the recognition and
incorporation of local government associations was
accompanied by central government asserting the primacy of
macro-economic considerations in determining the level of
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local government spending; and second, the greater
recognition and consultation afforded to local government in
the 1970s was given by central government and could
similarly be withdrawn. Local government had no
constitutionally enshrined right to participation: this
remained in the gift of central government.
Thus, when local government representatives on the CCLGF
were faced with severe cuts to local government expenditure
in the mid-l970s, following a period of sustained financial
growth, the consultation process was far from smooth and
ultimately the cuts were achieved through "a mix of
discussion, compromise and conflict through the established
machinery of government" (Stoker 1988, p14) . Central
government controlled the financial and constitutional
resources necessary to secure the cuts. But local
government was able to influence the process. For local
government to have been excluded completely from influence
over decision-making would have been politically unthinkable
at the time. The Labour government had been elected in part
through its commitment to work with representative
organisations and had succeeded a Conservative government
which had failed to do so successfully. Moreover, local
government representation on the CCLGF was provided in large
part by Labour councillors who had played a part in drawing
up Labour party policy while in opposition and had
campaigned for it at the general election. This provided
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Labour local government representatives with a degree of
political legitimacy within the consultative framework which
could be used in bargaining. This was a key difference of
consultation between local authorities and a Labour
government elected on corporatist principles in the 1970s
compared with local authority consultation by the
Conservative government elected in 1979 on a programme
rejecting corporatism: a rejection which became firmer with
each successive general election victory.
However, even in the 1970s, the involvement of local
authorities in national decision-making was conditional on
recognising central government's right to control key
financial decisions. This was backed by the understanding
that if local government peak associations strayed out of
line too far, it would jeopardise the opportunity for
regular consultation. Thus, over additionality, with its
implications for public spending, the role of the national
associations was severely constrained. As Rhodes (1986a,
p312) put it, the national associations were:
". . .a legitimized consultative channel with neither the
resources, nor in many instances, the desire to
challenge government... The costs of legitimacy are
respectability and responsibility but there are also
its rewards. The advantages of continuous access have
to be weighed against the need to play by the centre's
rules if the access is to be preserved".
T1e 1980s
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During the l9BOs, as relations between central and local
government deteriorated and the principles of corporatism
faded, the opportunities for influence available to the
national associations decreased. While some consultative
structures stayed in place, genuine consultation within
those structures declined. One illustration was the demise
of the CCLGF, which "was converted solely into a forum where
ministers announced hard and fast decisions to unavailing
protests by the local government representatives" (Rhodes
1986a, p377)
The resources of political legitimacy available to local
authorities in the l970s increasingly became a bargaining
resource for central government. Local authorities were
identified as wasteful and in need of major reform. For the
most part, there was little public support for local
authorities seeking to defend the status quo and local
government alone appeared powerless to resist change.
Indeed, only when local government reform was considered
unacceptable by a much broader constituency than local
government itself, notably over the poll tax, could
successful resistance be achieved. In short, success was
achieved on this issue because non-local government
resources were introduced into the policy network to tip the
balance against those of national government.
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While local government influence declined in the 1980s, the
national associations found themselves campaigning on an
increasing number of fronts as central government policy
challenged the role of local authorities in a range of
areas. Consequently, the additionality issue was relegated
in importance for local government. The attention of
national associations was focused on issues of more
immediate concern as central government pursued major
reforms to the structure, functions and finances of local
government.
Yet while local government made no advance on additionality
in the domestic sphere, the increasing attention UK local
authorities paid to the EC in the 1970s and 1980s meant that
the profile of the issue in Brussels was increased. As more
councils became recipients of ERDF grants, more became aware
of the additionality issue; and as representation to the
Commission in particular increased, the issue remained
alive.	 While individual councils raised the issue
individually, it was the views of UK local authorities
expressed collectively that mattered.
The main formal for channel for representation at EC-level
was the Consultative Committee of Local and Regional
Authorities (CCLRA) . This was established in 1976, and
although not formally recognised by the Commission until
1988, the CCLRA was an important forerunner to the Committee
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of the Regions agreed in the Maastricht Treaty. The
Commission listened to the CCLRA, not least because its
views on regional policy often dovetailed neatly with its
own. Because the CCLRA consisted of local and regional
government representatives from all member states it
provided the unelected Commission with a broader base of
support and thus greater legitimacy for its regional policy
arguments.
But while local authorities were increasingly listened to in
Brussels, their experience within the UK was the reverse.
Thus, the position taken by UK national government in
negotiations over the 1988 structural fund reform were
shaped essentially by discussions within government, through
formal interdepartmental committees and informal
interdepartmental linkages, with the Treasury view
dominating. While central government was required to
consult local authorities over EU regional policy matters,
subnational actors had no formal channels of participation
in the decision-making process until after the 1988 reform
of the structural funds.
The local authority view
Through the 1970s and 1980s, local authorities had
repeatedly made the point that although central government
claimed that ERDF was passed on to eligible councils, there
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was no way of seeing this The government argued that it
took anticipated ERDF receipts into account when deciding
how much public expenditure in total would be allocated to
local authorities. Without ERDF receipts, it argued, the
overall amount going to councils would be lower.
Local authorities believed that if ERDF was being passed on
it was having little impact on their ability to spend. This
was determined by the Annual Capital Guidelines (ACG) set
each financial year by central government for each of five
groups of services: housing (DoE); transport (Department of
Transport); education (Department of Education); personal
social services (Department of Health) ; and 'other services'
(DOE)
It was expected that most local authorities would attempt to
maximise their capital spending within this limit. However,
to do so meant that councils had to borrow and the borrowing
limit for each council was calculated by deducting the
receipts the council had available to spend (calculated on a
basis announced by the DOE) from the ACG figure given by the
government to the council. The remainder was the council's
maximum borrowing capacity for capital expenditure for the
financial year, otherwise know as Basic Credit Approvals
(BCA5) . Thus, Annual Capital Guidelines (ACG5) less
Receipts Taken Into Account (RTIA5) equals Basic Credit
Approvals (BCA5). Or,
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ACG5 - RTIA5 = BCAs
in 1982, Manchester City Council reported that:
••• under the present system of capital controls
operated by the Government, there is no provision for
such (ERDF) grants to increase Local Authorities'
ability to spend additional money in their own areas.
If this aspect of additionality is to be achieved, then
the Local Authorities concerned should be allowed to
increase their spending levels by the amount of ERDF
they receive" (House of Lords 1982, p49)
The point made by local authorities was that irrespective of
the source of the funds they had, the capital spending
limits set by the government limited their ability to act.
They could not prove that ERDF was not given to them, but if
it was, they felt little benefit from it. It was generally
assumed in local government that the main beneficiary of
ERDF in the UK was the Treasury which used it according to
the government's priorities, not those of the European
Commission. Thus, if EPJJF was given to councils it was
likely to be at the expense of other monies that would have
been given. As such, the process of allocating ERDF in the
UK was seen largely as a theoretical exercise because money
from the fund was as likely to go to non-ERDF authorities as
to those that were eligible. In practice, they argued, the
arrangements up to 1988 remained the same as outlined in the
DoE circular of 1976. The Commission believed that the UK
treatment of ERDF receipts was unique in this:
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"Within the Commission and other member states no-one
could believe what was going on in the UK... It meant
that thousands of people were working for nothing.
ERDF was going to the UK but it was being spent
indiscriminately, going to places like Southampton or
Aldershot which were not eligible. At the time, the
best way of benefiting UK local authorities would have
been to shut down their European offices: they would
get their share of ERDF anyway, as determined by the
government. The whole thing was a theoretical
exercise" (Commission official, 1995)
The government's treatment of the funds was justified by the
view that ERDF was public money, a rebate on the UK's
contribution to the Community budget:
"Mrs Thatcher said it was tour money: let's get our
money back!'. The theory was that it was public
expenditure paid through Brussels" (DOE official,
1995)
4.1/2 Local authorities and additionality 1988-1990
Following the reform of the structural funds in 1988, the
government's handling of ERDF receipts looked set to remain
unchanged. Following exchanges with the DoE, one council
Treasurer commented in February 1989:
"the DOE remains unwilling to recognise the receipt
of (ERDF) grant as conferring an equivalent amount of
additional spending power to the authority. The
previous proposal is repeated whereby the estimated
level of receipts for ERDF would enhance the national
total of credit approvals for distribution. Thus, in
theory, the grant related expenditure would be
initially scored against the basic credit approval
and financed by borrowing with the actual grant
itself being applied to redeem debt when received"
(Borough Treasurer 1989, p1)
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There was, however, a suggestion from the DoE that the
government might consider weighting the distribution of
credit approvals to match the distribution of expected ERDF
receipts. This would mean taking credit approvals from
local authorities that did not qualify for ERDF grants to
give to others that did, while retaining a constant level of
credit approvals overall. The government would issue
Supplementary Credit Approvals (SCA5) to councils to allow
them to borrow more to spend on ERDF projects. When ERDF
was subsequently paid by the Commission, the councils would
then use this to pay off the loans they had taken out. This
was known as 'top-slicing'
While the top-slicing approach would benefit ERDF
authorities at the expense of non-ERDF authorities it would
not represent additional spending, but instead would simply
be a redistribution of existing spending capacity. Such a
move had the potential to split local authorities over the
additionality issue. As the Borough Treasurer quoted above
put it:
"In the past this authority has supported the
principle of full additionality of spending power
from ERDF grants rather that such 'top-slicing'
However, if the only choice available is between a
weighted or unweighted distribution.., a weighted
allocation should prove more advantageous to this
authority" (Borough Treasurer 1989, p1)
A DOE circular of August 1989 said that ministers had
considered whether any allowance should be made in the
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distribution of credit approvals for the expected likely
distribution of ERDF receipts. The decision was that:
••• in general it is appropriate to continue existing
practice, and that capital allocations to local
authorities should be based on overall assessments of
authorities' needs to spend, without explicit account
being taken of whether expenditure which needs to be
incurred may be financed through EP.DF grant" (Parker,
DOE, 1989)
However, the same circular indicated the first concession by
the government on ERDF:
"Ministers have, however, decided that there may be
instances where the expected distribution of ERDF
receipts should, in exceptional circumstances, be
taken into account as one of the factors in
determining Annual Capital Guidelines (ACGs)
(Parker, DoE, 1989, p1)
For these 'exceptional circumstances'	 the government
proposed that up to £25m of the Other Services Block (OSB)
ACG total should be 'earmarked' for this purpose and
distributed according to a formula which would include
estimated future ERDF receipts in the OSE as a factor. Much
of what was deemed eligible for ERDF assistance fell within
the 'Other Services' spending area.	 The main elements
covered by this block of spending were:
- general administration
- economic development and planning implementation
- waste collection and disposal
- parks and open spaces
- environmental health
- trading services
- arts and libraries (Department of National Heritage)
- consumer protection (DTI)
- careers and sheltered employment (Department of
Employment)
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- smaliholdings (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food)
(The DoE had responsibility for policy on all the above
unless otherwise stated. Source: DoE 1993, p27)
The £25m earmarked represented an estimated l2.5 of ERDF
grant income for authorities covered by the DoE. Such an
arrangement was deemed necessary because:
a) the relative size of the Other Services Block means
that some authorities' ACG may not be large enough in
any one year to accommodate major schemes;
b) the number of eligible authorities and the potential
number of schemes make it impracticable to invite bids
for major projects against a central top slice.
(Source: Parker, DoE, August 1989)
The contradiction in the government's position claimed by
local authorities and the Commission appeared to have been
given weight by this and similar pronouncements. The
government was clearly determined to make capital
allocations to local authorities according to its own
assessment of what they needed to spend, irrespective of
what 'additional' monies were deemed necessary by either
local authorities or the Commission for ERDF purposes. At
the same time, however, the government recognised that the
ongoing arrangements needed adjustment if local authorities
were to be able to take advantage of ERDF grants to prevent
them being lost to the UK. As one local authority Treasurer
put it:
"The government seem intent on making the system
unnecessarily cumbersome in their continued efforts to
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restrict local authority capital expenditure" (Borough
treasurer, August 1990, p2)
The introduction of limited top-slicing recognised the need
for additional spending by some councils receiving ERDF in
'exceptional circumstances'. The corollary of this appeared
to be that in normal circumstances there would be no
additional spending in recognition of ERDF receipts.
Thus, while top-slicing of £25m may have been a significant
concession politically, it was only for exceptional
circumstances. The only non-exceptional additionality the
government appeared prepared to allow on a regular basis was
that "EC grants will reduce the debt servicing charges of
the authorities receiving them and provide a direct benefit
to the revenue accounts of those authorities" (DoE Circular
1990, p4) . However, as before 1988, even the additionality
of this 'concession' was disputed As one council Treasurer
put it:
"In simple terms, it appears that savings on interest
payments, arising from the receipt of European grants,
are fully clawed back by central government through
reductions in Revenue Support Grant and in effect, it
means that European grants are worthless to a Local
Authority unless it can secure supplementary credit
approvals" (Taylor 1991, p1)
In short, local authorities did not feel that the post-1988
situation had significantly improved. The government's
position appeared to contradict the additionality principle
contained in Article 9 of the 1988 regulations and the
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problems facing local authorities continued. A survey
completed by the Association of District Councils (ADC)
mapped out some of the problems. For example, councils in
the South West of England stated that they had been
allocated £2.55 million of ERDF for the period 1989-91
towards an industrial land and building sub-programme, but
that they had run into problems:
"Local authorities are expecting to bring forward
schemes which will only be capable of claiming £1.1
million in ERDF grant. The reason for this is that
local authorities do not have sufficient credit
approvals to undertake capital schemes. The district
councils in Cornwall need additional approval in the
order of £2.9 million over the next two years" (ADC
1990, p4)
Similar problems existed in the North East of England with
Wansbeck District Council (DC) claiming it had "insufficient
capital expenditure and credit approvals to support a
significant investment in projects grant-assisted by the EC
without cut-backs elsewhere by the Council's capital
programme" (ADC 1990, p4). In the Yorkshire and Humberside
region, Hull City Council reported that there was a risk
that "major schemes recognised as being eligible for ERDF
support by the Regional co-ordinating Committee (plus DoE
and EEC) may be unable to proceed due to capital restraints
on local authorities" (ADC 1990, p4)
The pattern in Wales was similar, with Merthyr Tydfil
Borough Council (BC) reporting that the "block to
utilization of European monies has been that grants count
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against capital receipts and therefore any scheme proposed
has to compete with other Council priorities" (ADC 1990,
p5). Newport BC stated that:
"It is believed the value of obtaining European
Commission funding has been undermined and is
becoming increasingly marginal. To support this
statement, it is commented that no additional
spending power flows from successful application,
than any grant is offset by a requirement to set
aside an equivalent sum for debt redemption under the
new capital controls. . ." (ADC 1990, p5)
The 'new capital controls' referred to became effective in
April 1990 in relation to ERDF grants and were an extension
of the previous controls that had been in operation since
1981. These 1981 rules were central to the additionality
problem since they were the ones which required local
authorities to contain any expenditure financed by EPJJF
grants within their basic capital allocations as set by
central government which, as outlined above, 'anticipated'
EP.DF receipts in calculating these allocations.
However, when the Commission questioned the government on
additionality it's response was one that had been
anticipated: there was no new requirement for the government
to demonstrate additionality because the UK had not
benefited from the 'increase in the appropriations' for the
funds. The Commission argued that the UK government had not
demonstrated additionality before the 1988 reform and as
problems persisted, was obliged to do so. The dispute cuit
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between the two sides came to a head with a Community
Initiative programme for coalfield areas called RECHAR.
4.1/3 Ori gins of the Rechar Programme
As discussed in Chapter Two, Community programmes focussing
on regions across member states affected by the decline of a
dominant industry had been a distinct feature of the
Commission's use of non-quota aid during the 1980s. Pre-
dating the reform of the funds in 1988, 'Community
programmes' had, for example, been established for steel
areas (RESIDER) and* shipbuilding areas (RENAVAL) in
decline. Thus, when the British alliance of coalfield local
authorities, the Coalfield Communities Campaign (CCC),
sought EC assistance for mining areas in decline, there were
clear precedents for a Community-wide programme.
That ECU 5.5 billion of the total structural fund budget for
1989-93 was reserved for 'Community Initiatives' meant that
funds were clearly available for sectoral programmes.
Although ECU 1.7 billion of this was committed to the
programmes agreed before the reform of the funds, the
remaining ECU 3.8 billion "left the Commission considerable
room for manoeuvre" (McAleavey 1993, p98) . 	 However, under
the 1988 regulations, 8O of the Community initiative monies
had to be spent in Objective 1 areas. This meant stiff
competition for the funds available for new Community
144
Initiatives in non-Objective 1 areas. That the majority of
the Community's coalfields were outside the Objective 1
areas, including all of the British coalfield, meant that
the creation of a special programme for coalfield areas was
not a foregone conclusion.
However, it was clear to CCC officials that in Bruce Millan
they had a very sympathetic Commissioner who, "was well
aware of the problems of coal areas and had in fact
addressed a CCC conference within days of taking office"
(Fothergill 1992, p25). As the Labour government's
Secretary of State for Scotland in the 1970s, Millan, along
with four of his Cabinet colleagues, had been responsible
for appointing the Commission on Energy and the Environment,
which among its conclusions, noted:
"Mining has often been highly localised in areas
which have become almost exclusively dependent on
this single industry with very limited alternative
opportunities for employment. With it have grown up
extremely closely knit communities with an
exceptionally developed sense of group identity
reinforced by a strong tradition" (Commission on
Energy and the Environment 1981, p2)
Mining communities were in this sense unique and any
necessary restructuring of the coal industry should be
sensitive to these social and economic features, argued the
1981 Commission. That critics of the UK government felt
that this argument had been largely ignored following the
year-long coal strike of 1984-85 was unlikely to have been
missed by the new Commissioner. By the time Commissioner
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Millan took office in January 1989, the British coal
industry had lost over 80,000 mining jobs since the end of
the strike in March 1985.
It had also become clear to CCC officials in their dealings
with the Commission before the appointment of Mr Millan,
that their prospects for success in securing any form of
Community assistance for coal areas would be greatly
enhanced if representations were made from across the
Community coalfields rather than from a group representing
interests in one country. This knowledge was a key factor
in CCC mobilising local and regional coalfield local
authorities in other member states to form a Community-wide
alliance of mining areas. Given the working name ACOM
(Action for Mining Communities), this transnational network
was formally constituted as EUPACOM (European Action for
Mining Communities) in October 1991. ACOM represented local
and regional authorities in the coalfields of Belgium,
France, Germany, Spain and Portugal as well as in the UK,
thus covering virtually all of the EC's coal producing
areas. The Barnsley-based CCC was to provide the
secretariat for the new transnational organisation.
With the sympathy of the Commissioner responsible, ACOM made
swift progress towards securing a coalfield programme of
aid. It did so by enlisting the support of coalfield MPS
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and MEP5 and by maintaining close contact with Commission
officials and supplying specialist advice and information
when required. For the Commission, ACOM brought legitimacy
in its efforts to provide a coalfield areas programme. ACOM
represented virtually every coalmining area of the
Community. In December 1989, the Commission announced
formal approval for a programme of aid for mining areas
(RECHAR), which was planned to run from the beginning of
1990 to the end of 1993. The process of lobbying for the
programme, originally by CCC and eventually by ACOM provided
evidence of the growing importance of transnational networks
in Community regional policy-making and equally of the
importance of the Commission in shaping and developing these
networks. In this particular instance at least, the
relationship between the Commission and the developing
transnational lobby was clearly symbiotic.
The UK government and RECHA.R
The CCC had found little encouragement from central
government when seeking support for its efforts to secure
Community assistance for the coalfields.	 The government
made clear that it did not favour the Community funding
sectoral programmes. It argued that:
u sectoral programmes distort the overall pattern that
has been agreed on the Community Support Frameworks and
are not normally necessary... long-term industrial
problems like the run-down in the coal industry can be
accommodated in the CSF5" (DTI official, 1992)
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The Government's position on this matter was quite clear,
even if it disappointed local authorities. As a matter of
policy the government did not support bids for sectoral
programmes of the type RECHAR would represent. However,
once it became clear that such a programme was likely to be
approved it was quick to seek to maximise the benefits to
the UK. As the CCC director put it:
"The UK government, which had described its position
as 'positively neutral' when the proposals were first
mooted, swung to a position of enthusiastic support
when it realised that such a programme was a real
possibility and that the UK would be the largest
beneficiary" (Fothergill 1992, p25)
4.1/4 Details of the RECHAR Programme
The RECHAR programme covered the coalfield areas of Belgium,
France, Germany, Portugal, Spain and the UK. It would
provide ECU 300m in grants, mainly from ERDF for spending on
capital projects, but with a small amount of ESF also
available to assist with the revenue costs of some projects.
There would also be up to ECU 120m of interest rebates
available on a total of approximately ECU 800m of ECSC loans
in the period 1990-93. Supplementary assistance of a
further ECU 40m from the ECSC would be provided in 1990 for
the redeployment of former miners. Areas which qualified
for RECHAR were those where coal mining activities were
still taking place or where at least 1,000 persons were
employed in the coal sector as of 1 January 1984 or later,
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and which had lost, (or were set to lose), at least 1,000
mining jobs after that date. The aim of RECHAR was:
"To promote the economic conversion and social
renewal of coal-mining areas which have been
seriously affected by decline in the sector, thus
contributing to the reduction of disparities in
development and living standards in the Community"
(Commission undated, p1).
This was to be achieved through a range of measures which
would promote new job-creating activities, provide
vocational training and improve the environment.
Of the 28 areas Community-wide which had been identified for
assistance, no fewer than 12 were in the UK, with
allocations being made to areas in proportion to the number
of coal industry jobs lost in the period 1984 to 1990. As
such, UK local authorities, identified as the main spenders
of RECHAR in the UK, could expect almost half of the total
fund: approximately ECU l7Om at 1989 prices. Bids for
RECHAR funding were to be submitted by member governments
following consultation with the appropriate local and
regional authorities.
The announcement of the programme was greeted with
celebration by the coalfield authorities involved. While
all the efforts had been concentrated on lobbying for
programme and then shaping its detail, the potential for the
additionality problem facing the UK authorities in receipt
of RECHAR had not featured at this stage. While local
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authorities clearly had personnel familiar with the problem,
it was not an issue raised during CCC meetings prior to the
programme being announced. Much of the lobbying for RECHAR
had been undertaken by the CCC/ACOM secretariat and senior
councillors within the organisation. Many of those
centrally involved were unaware of the additionality problem
and others believed that it would not affect RECHAR as a new
Community Initiative programme which would be clearly
addi:ional to anticipated EU regional aid and as such would
requ±.re demonstrable increases in local authority spending.
It. certainly appeared to be the Commission's view that
RECHAR was unique and demanded a unique response where
addi:ionality had previously not been transparent: in this
sense, the UK was clearly a target. RECHAR. was the first
significant Community Initiative programme after the 1988
reform of the structural funds and had been announced after
the JK government had set out its public expenditure plans
for The coming financial period. As such, the Commission
believed, this would require changes to be made to the
publ:c expenditure plans to accommodate RECHAR. If no such
changes were made it would be clear that RECHAR would not be
treazed additionally. Whatever the motivation of the
Commission or the Commissioner, RECHAR was clearly viewed as
test case by the Commission for additionality in the UK.
150
4.2 The RECHAR dispute
4.2/1 The views of the Commission and the UK government
When taking up his Commission position in January 1989, as
the new structural fund regulations came into effect, Mr
Millan expressed the dissatisfaction he had felt towards the
Treasury over its interpretation of additionality during his
time as Secretary of State for Scotland:
"Every quarter we drew up a list of projects or
companies due to get national assistance. We knew
roughly what the UK as a whole and Scotland would get
from the EC each year. So we just picked out as many
projects as were needed to make up the UK quota, and
sent the list off to Brussels. Back came the EC
money, and the Treasury simply lopped that amount off
its expenditure" (quoted in Cutler et al, 1989, p.92,
reproduced by McAleavey 1992, p27)
McAleavey (1992, pp.27-28) draws attention to a series of
visits to national capitals made by Commissioner Millan in
his first year of office. During these visits he informed
government ministers in the UK and elsewhere that he would
be placing emphasis on the additionality criteria being met
and that he would "challenge" those governments whose
response was not satisfactory. By the summer of 1990 when
it became apparent to Commissioner Millan that the British
share of RECHAR would not be passed on to the coalfields, he
attempted to put pressure on the 13K Government by refusing
to release the UK share of RECHAR until the government gave
guarantees on additionality.
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The UK government's initial response to Mr Millan's decision
was to deny that it was flouting Community rules. For his
part, Commissioner Millan argued that while there had always
been a 'moral obligation' for the government to ensure
additionality, this obligation had been made specific for
the first time in the Article 9 of the 1988 coordination
regulation. Moreover, other governments had responded
satisfactorily to the requirements of the new clause,
leaving the UK government the only remaining target on
additionality. Commissioner Millan stated:
"We do not have problems with other governments in
the way we have had problems with the UK
government... I do not think I have a real problem in
principle with any other member state" (House of
Lords 1991, plO2, para. 531)
In response, the UK government restated its argument that as
the wording on additionality in Article 9 referred to
additionality for 'the increase in the appropriations' of
the Structural Funds and as the UK would not be receiving
extra monies as a result of the doubling of the funds, it
was under no legal requirement to demonstrate additionality
(House of Lords 1991, p26, para. 78) . Despite this, the
government insisted that it was in fact meeting the
underlying principle of additionality. As Peter Lilley,
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry put it:
"We build that money (anticipated from the Structural
Funds) into our planning proposals, and if it were
not there we would not spend so much" (House of Lords
1991, p156, para 757)
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The government also stated that this money was 'definitely'
passed on to local authorities.
The two sides of this dispute had apparently entrenched
positions which led to a stalemate lasting over a year.
While the UK share of RECHAR was retained in Brussels, funds
from the programme were released to other member states. By
refusing to release RECHAR payments to the UK, the
Commission had deliberately raised the stakes over the
control of ERIJF expenditure.
While the Commission had long been sympathetic to the
arguments of UK local authorities that ERDF receipts were
not used additionally, there had been no major push by the
Commission on additionality before 1988. That activity on
this increased after 1988 was undoubtedly due in part to the
determination of Commissioner Millan. However, the basis
for action on additionality was provided by the inclusion of
Article 9 of the 1988 regulations. This, the Commission
argued, set out quite clearly what was required of member
governments.
The Commission's position was further strengthened by
indications of support from the local authorities that would
be affected by delays to the payment of RECHAR. In the
event, this support was complete and effective, with none of
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the authorities affected by the withholding of RECHAR
payments critical of the Commission's actions. This
'alliance' against government policy on additionality
between the Commission and UK local authorities, although
often implicit, provided a unique element to the history of
Community regional policy making which would challenge
established decision-making practices. Crucially, the
willingness of local authorities to support the Commission
added further evidence to the argument that under existing
arrangements they stood to benefit very little from RECHAR.
4.2,2 What local authorities wanted
It was clear soon after the RECHAR dispute started that
'securing additionality' could mean more than one thing.
For the Commission, the main objective was for the ERDF
grant element of any project to treated as additional to
planned domestic expenditure and for this to be
'transparent'. For local authorities, the ultimate ambition
was both for the ERDF contribution to be additional and for
the UK contribution to be additional to what would have been
spent without receipt of ERDF monies. This would mean
additionality in total for ERDF-sponsored schemes and not
just for the non-domestic contribution. Local authorities
wanted this because of the difficulties some experienced in
raising the matching funding necessary to co-finance ERDF
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projects, which was required under the structural fund
regulations.
Under the matching funding requirement, local authorities
had to provide up to 5O of the expenditure on ERDF
projects. With local authority budgets under increasing
pressure from central government, this requirement meant
that some local authorities faced a constant struggle in
order not to lose out on ERDF grants. Generally though,
local authority matching funding was found from one of three
sources: receipts (for example from property sales);
reserves; and most importantly, borrowing (up to the limit
set by central government in its allocation of BCA5 in
England and Wales or Capital Consents in Scotland)
As part of its macro-economic policy to control public
spending, local authority ECAs and Capital Consents had been
falling in the 1980s. Local authorities recognised that it
was unlikely that central government would reverse this
trend to make extra spending available for the domestic
contribution to ERDF projects even if the Commission could
secure additionality for the EC contribution. Thus, the
realistic objective for local authorities was to secure
additionality for the EC contribution and then find ways
around the matching funding problems. While these had
provided some difficulties for some local authorities,
generally they were not seen as insurmountable.
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4.2/3 Early Negotiations Between Local Authorities and the
DoE
A meeting between local authorities and the DOE in July
1990 suggested little change in the Government's position
was likely. As one participant put it:
"The meeting yesterday with the DoE did not appear to
offer any hope of the current Government changing the
rules on ERDF grant since they indicated that the
Treasury would continue to insist that such grants
would still form part of national expenditure limits
and Public Sector Borrowing Requirements. The DoE
also indicated that there would be no change in the
current arrangements for 1990/91 with the possible
exception of an increase in the l2.5 minimum level
of SCA5 on All Other Services. The only way forward
in the short term, therefore, appears to be to lobby
for a change in the distribution pattern of ACGs and
BCAs for 1991/92 and beyond" (Hoyland 1990, p2).
Not f or the first time, the Treasury was identified as the
government department crucial to determining government
policy over additionality. At the same meeting, local
authority treasurers outlined three problems associated with
the RECHAR programme.
First, was the lack of specific ECA5 or SCAs to support the
capital expenditure associated with RECHAR. RECHAR
expenditure would comprise a substantial part of the OSB
credit approvals and in the case of some smaller authorities
the OSB would be too small to permit projects to be
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undertaken in line with the RECHAR submission to the
European Commission.
Second, was that the revenue consequences of RECHAR
expenditure would impinge significantly on those authorities
subject to Poll Tax "capping" arrangements. This
expenditure would arise from three areas:
1. Debt charges associated with capital expenditure.
2. A general lack of capital receipts requiring
authorities to use revenue contributions as a means of
topping up capital expenditure.
3. The direct effect of ESF expenditure within the
RECHAR programme.
The third problem was the contradictory financial signals
being sent by central government which suggested it wanted
local authorities to make maximum use of EC finance but did
not want local authorities to breach the overall public
spending limits, which were a principal part of government
policy (Latham 1990, p1-2)
The DOE officials responded by stating that they understood
the authorities' arguments, but did not accept that the
government was sending contradictory financial signals: the
total amount of public expenditure agreed by the Treasury
could not be breached in any circumstances. To make the
position clear, CCC officials were told:
1. That there were no "spare" ECAs or SCAs (at that
stage of the year) to be redistributed to RECHAR
authorities.
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2. That attempts to have RECHAR money redefined within
the Treasury so as to take it outside public
expenditure controls had been tried and had not been
found acceptable.
3. That the local authority proposal to disregard
capital and revenue restrictions in the definition of
RECHAR expenditure was not acceptable, as if the
expenditure took place then there would be no deemed
"public expenditure cover" for the additional
expenditure (Latham, 1990)
The UK government was due to submit the final REC}LkR
programme to the Commission just eight days after this
meeting (July 27) and was "concerned to hear that local
authorities felt that under the current rules they would be
unable to take up the RECHAR monies, as this implied that
there was insufficient public expenditure cover and that
they could not submit the programme" (Latham 1990, p2).
However, the programme was submitted, on the assumption that
"if local authorities did not take up the funds then other
agencies, predominantly British Coal, would be able to do
so" (Latham 1990, p2)
Thus, in July 1990, the DTI submitted the RECHAR programme
on behalf of the UK government. For RECHAR purposes, the UK
had been divided into eleven 'operational programme areas',
each of which had drawn up a plan for spending RECHAR with
local authority involvement. Had there been no
additionality problem, the funds would have been released by
the Commission in December 1990 and additional economic
development projects in coalfield areas would have started
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early in 1991. However, by the end of 1991, the UK share of
RECHAR was still with the Commission, with Commissioner
Millan having made clear his refusal to release the UK share
of RECHAR money until he was satisfied that it would result
in additional spending in coalfield areas.
Local authorities step up their activity and align with the
Counnission
The DOE position on additionality expressed at the July
meeting with local authorities was the re-statement that
additionality applied at national level and that this system
generally worked for ERDF-qualifying authorities. That the
general pattern of ERDF distribution had been altered by the
RECHAR programme affecting only a limited number of
authorities had been recognised by the limited top-slicing
arrangement introduced. But the central problem for the CCC
authorities remained: that it was impossible to prove
whether RECHAR expenditure was taken into account at all
when the Government drew up its public expenditure plans.
The suspicion was that no extra provision had been made.
However, there were perceived dangers in the CCC continuing
to argue that additionality was being denied. If CCC argued
this to the ultimate, then,
"we will have to admit that we cannot spend the money
because of current Government rules and, therefore,
will not obtain any net benefit to our communities.
The consequence of this is that we will retain a
purity of approach and will have to blame the
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Government for its failure to adopt proper policies"
Latham 1990, p3)
The CCC representatives had also been left in no doubt that
to engage Commission support for this approach would lead to
an "e-.ren stronger rejection from central government, who
will object violently to the principle of the Commission
formu.ating any part of public expenditure policy for the
UK" (Latham 1990, p3)
The aternative approach to confrontation that the CCC and
its supporters could take was to agree to a DoE suggestion
that The distributional aspects of RECHAR could be looked
at, but that the issue of the totality of public expenditure
was cThsed. One of the problems of this approach, as
already suggested, was that it could divide local
authorities. Shortly after the meeting with the DoE, the
position adopted by CCC was made clear in a letter from its
director to the director of the Local Government
International Bureau (LGIB) which co-ordinated structural
fund policy for the national local government associations:
'Any capital or revenue expenditure by a local
authority which is eligible for aid through the RECHAR
rograme should be disregarded in determining the
evel of that authority's capital or revenue
expenditure for comparison with the ceilings laid down
by central government" (Fothergill 1990, p2)
This was recognised by CCC as an 'ambitious stance' but "the
only one that satisfies the needs of some member authorities
for whom the problem is lack of adequate capital spending
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cover not just for RECHAR grants themselves but also for the
matching local authority contribution" (Fothergill 1990,
p2).
The LGIB put forward a more cautious approach. In a paper
to the AMA Policy Committee of July 26, it recommended that:
"- the relative strengths of the Commission and
Treasury positions on this be recognised:
realistically it must be unlikely in the current
climate that the Government would reverse their policy
on additionality, thereby making more money available
to local government;
- recognition be given to the value of savings to
local authorities in interest payments that the
present policy on EPJJF bringst
- the possibly vulnerable position of local
authorities on Social Fund receipts (where some
additional benefit was perceived) be recognised and
priority be given to protecting 	 these" (Local
Government International Bureau 1990, p4).
Thus, within local government, there were differences of
opinion on how to proceed on additionality. The CCC,
concerned as it was primarily with the RECHAR programme,
could perhaps afford to be more ambitious, knowing that in
the 'current climate' the government was unlikely to concede
significant ground on additionality for the whole of ERDF
receipts, but might be prepared to be flexible on the
relatively small sums involved with RECKAR, if sufficient
pressure was applied. Moreover, there was also the
possibility that the 'current climate' might change.
However, what the events of July 1990 had made clear was
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that the government had no intention of willingly making a
significant change to its position on additionality for
either ERDF generally or for RECHAR.
The joint position adopted by the AMA, ACC and ADC was
presented to the government at the Consultative Council on
Local Government Finance on September 7, 1990. It accepted
that 'additionality takes place at the national level', but
expressed concern that this 'does not translate into
additionality locally'
"In general credit approvals are distributed to
individual local authorities on the basis of overall
spending need with no regard being had to whether
expenditure is to be supported by EC grants...
Receipt of EC grant does not convey spending power
unlike other capital grants" (AMA, ACC and ADC 1990,
p1)
The associations identified the £25m in top-slicing for
1990-91 as a recognition of 'the case advanced by local
government', but argued that this did not go far enough:
"The national enhancement to spending programmes
should translate into full additionality locally.
The Associations would like the Government to
recognise the case for full additionality and to
consider with the Associations how best this can be
achieved" AMA, ACC and ADC 1990, p1)
Thus, by Autumn 1990 the national local authority
associations were increasingly active on additionality.
Authorities individually, also set out their problems with
existing arrangements, even with the £25m top-slicing
arrangement:
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"If the £25m held back represents 1/8th of grant
income, the Government's estimate of income (from
ERDF) nationally must be £200m. Nationally, spending
on these ERDF schemes must therefore be assumed to be
£400m.
"The ACG issued nationally for OSB schemes is only
£245m. Assuming the £25m is also distributed the OSB
total will increase to £270m. How can authorities
carry out ERDF programmes of £400m plus all the other
schemes covered by the OSE block on a total
allocation of only £270m? Clearly, authorities
cannot be receiving full additionality via the Other
Services Block" (Bradford City Council 1990, p1).
Bradford stated that for the year 1990-91 it would have a
total credit approval for the OSE of £1.615m if it was given
an additional 12.5%- approval based on the estimated size of
its OSE ERDF receipts. However, given that these estimated
receipts were £3.8m and the Council's total OSB ERDF
programme approximately EGm, the credit approval provision
fell well short of what Bradford needed if all ERDF-
sponsored projects were to be additional. Indeed, "the
Government's provision is not even sufficient to cover the
OSE EPDF grant we receive from Europe. Other council
capital resources will therefore have to be used to make up
the shortfall" (Bradford City Council 1990, p2)
Fife Regional Council sent a report to the Commission in
January 1991 detailing how authorities in Scotland still did
not even benefit from the reduction in the amount of
interest paid on loans which appeared to be the clearest net
benefit to authorities in receipt of ER]JF. The report
pointed out that "any reduction in capital charges result in
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a similar reduction of the authority's entitlement to
Revenue Support Grant from Central Government" (Fife
Regional Council 1991, Notes, p1)
In response to a CCC request for a meeting on additionality
in October 1990, the reply came that:
"the Government's by now well-established policy in
regard to ERDF receipts, additionality and domestic
public expenditure controls has been well aired... At
the present time I feel there would, therefore, be
little point in our meeting to discuss the matter"
(Atkins 1990, p1)
There was, however, further top-slicing. In April 1991,
loca authorities were informed that for the year 1991-92 a
maximum of £45m in SCAs for ERDF grants would be allocated
to aualifying authorities. Again, this was seen as a slight
improvement secured through local authority lobbying, but
was still insufficient to prevent local authorities
continuing their campaign on additionality and maintaining
support for the Commission.
4.24 Commission activity over RECHkR
In his speech to annual conference of the CCC in March 1991,
Anton Herpels of the Commission (]JG V) made some qualified
conunents on the additionality debate as it affected the UK.
He suggested it was 'in many aspects... an internal British
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affair', but which remained of 'extreme importance' to the
Commission because:
"lack of additionality undermines the "raison d'etre"
of its (the Commission's) funds. And so, the
Commission will continue to require guarantees from
the Member States that this principle is respected.
If the Commission did not obtain satisfaction, it
would inevitably draw its own conclusions prior to
being committed in a further round" (Herpels 1991,
p9).
It was shortly after this speech that Commissioner Millan
responded to the 'unsatisfactory' position of the UK
Government by announcing his decision not to release RECHAR
funds to the UK. In April 1991 Commissioner Millan
explained to the European Parliament that despite numerous
meetings with British ministers and officials, he was "still
not satisfied that the current system of treating structural
fund grants in the United Kingdom taken as a whole
satisfactorily transmits the effective value of Community
structural funds to the eligible regions" (European
Parliament 1991, p255, col. 437) . Commissioner Millan also
made the point that the Commission had "no problem with any
other Member State in any way similar to the problem we have
with the UK Government" (European Parliament 1991, p255,
col. 438) . As such there would be no delay in releasing
RECHAR monies to other qualifying Member States.
Commissioner Millan made clear what he required from the UK
Government to prompt him into releasing RECHAR funds:
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"I would like.., the UK Government to separate out
the regional fund receipts from the other aspects of
local authority borrowing consent... on a basis which
took no account of regional funds and then allocated
that on the basis of the actual distribution of the
regional fund so that the whole process was
completely transparent and we could be satisfied that
the funds we are making available through RECHAR and
other programmes were reaching the areas concerned"
(European Parliament 1991, p256, cal. 439)
By January 1992, the dispute had been ongoing for several
months with the Commission receiving public support from the
CCC and individual coalfield local authorities.
Commissioner Millan said at the time:
"There comes a point when you have to say this
(additionality problem) can't go on indefinitely. We
must see whether we can resolve this problem and the
RECHAR programme was the occasion f or it. It
happened to be the first of the Community initiatives
that was under the reform" (Local Government
Chronicle 1992a, p16)
Moreover, by the beginning of 1992, the Commission had
warned the UK government that unless changes were made,
another E850m due to be allocated to the UK under the CSFs
for the 1992-93 period could be blocked. The justification
for this was that,
"the (additionality) problem is longstanding so
obviously it affects not just RECHAR. If you block
that and everything else carries on regardless it is
unfair to RECHAR areas. So the logic of it is that
any programmes which fail to meet the additionality
requirement should not have approval until we get
more satisfactory arrangements" (Local Government
Chronicle 1992a, p16)
The failure of the UK government to keep separate accounts
for EC grants, to make its additionality arrangements
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'transparent' was the major sticking point. As one
Commission official put it:
"If you accept their explanation, some of our money
goes into everything - in the same sort of way that
if you were to get a barrel of red dye and drop it
into a gigantic barrel of water you would get some of
the red dye in every cup you took out. That means
some of the money is presumably going to Surrey which
isn't exactly an area that qualifies for assistance
under the structural funds (Graham Meadows, DG
XVI, Local Government Chronicle 1992a, p16)
4.2/5 A key turning point: The Heseltine Memo
A key turning point in the dispute between the Commission
and the UK government was marked in January 1992 with the
leak of an internal memo prepared by the DOE for Michael
Heseltine, the Secretary of State. The memo, sent to the
Secretaries of State for Scotland (Ian Lang) and Wales
(David Hunt) was accompanied by a letter which had been
leaked to the press on December 17, 1991, in advance of the
full memo. The letter said:
"We need to take action to improve the public
expenditure treatment of European Regional
Development Fund monies coming to UK regions. Our
present arrangements fail to ensure that local
authorities and other bodies are able to spend the
ERDF receipts to which they are entitled" (Heseltine
1991, p1)
Mr Heseltine did not dispute that ERDF funds were taken into
account in setting public expenditure programmes, thus
making these higher than they otherwise would have been.
167
However, he argued that what the existing system failed to
do, something the government had never claimed it did, was:
"to channel public expenditure cover to those bodies
receiving ERDF, or to show transparency in tracing
cover f or ERDF receipts through the system"
(Heseltine 1991, p1)
Mr Heseltine described the existing arrangements as 'no
longer tenable'. The ERIJF, worth approximately £380m per
year to England, Scotland and Wales should, he argued,
should have been of 'great political benefit' to the
government. Instead, the ERDF had become 'a constant source
of friction and recrimination' from the Commission, local
authorities and MPs. The considerations for the Government
were not merely financial, as Mr Heseltine stated:
"We cannot afford such an "own goal" in areas which
are politically important to us" (Heseltine 1991,
p1).
The more comprehensive memo, leaked to the press in January
1992, outlined the limited benefits to local authorities of
ERDF grants, citing Bradford among a number of authorities
which had been unable to take the ERDF grant allocated to
them for 1990/91. While maintaining the position that ERDF
rece.pts meant that the public expenditure total was
subsequently higher than it would have been, the memo stated
that:
"The benefit of ERDF receipts is... spread across all
authorities rather than being felt by the recipient
authority of the grant... Some authorities are now
aware of this fact and beginning to use it to
embarrass the Government" (Heseltine 1992, p6)
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With regard to arguments that ERDF authorities save money on
interest payments on loans they would otherwise have to take
out, the memo outlined a mixed pattern. It explained how
the Revenue Support Grant (RSG) is distributed to local
authorities by reference to the Standard Spending Assessment
(SSA) and that one element of the SSA reflects the estimated
need for expenditure on the costs of capital financing. In
Scotland, however, the memo argued "the ERDF grant is of
minimal benefit to the individual authority", with any
interest savings "distributed on a per head basis among all
authorities" (Heseltine 1992, p6) . In Wales, the use of
ERDF for debt redemption "leads to a reduction in the debt
assumed for calculating the capital financing SSA element"
although there is some "temporary financing benefit"
(Heseltine 1992, p6) . In England, the memo states that
there "is no reduction in SSA as a result of being in
receipt of ERDF grant" (Heseltine 1992, p6) . A fact which,
it has been noted, has been disputed by some English local
authorities.
The highly critical tone of the memo was perhaps summed up
by the comment that:
"The very limited benefit to the individual
authorities receiving EC grant may prove to be
insufficient incentive in the longer term for an
authority to go through the substantial efforts of
securing grant. Moreover, many authorities have up
till now been working quite hard to secure grant
which benefits Scotland, Wales or an English Region
significantly but themselves only slightly. This may
well not continue, making it more difficult to take
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the share of EC receipts allocated to the UK"
(Heseltine 1992, pp. 6-7)
Additionality in other member states
The Department of the Environment had also researched the
situation on additionality in other member states and
identified three broad approaches to handling Community
receipts, the third of which was closest to the UK
situation.
The first approach, which paired together France and Germany
was characterised by the inclusion in the national public
expenditure systems of 'direct budgetary lines' for ERDF
receipts. This meant that, unlike the case of the UK,
anticipated ERDF receipts could not be mixed with other
budget lines and thus "central government grants are not
seen to be reduced by the amount of such receipts as they
are in the UK" (Heseltine 1991, Annexe B) . It was suggested
that
"the French further protect themselves from
Commission accusations of non-additionality by
organising the national resources spent on
operational programmes into distinct multi-annual
programmes. The size of these commitments of
national resources are determined before likely
levels of ERDF receipts are known. To this extent
ERDF receipts in France are genuinely additional"
(Heseltine 1991, Annexe B)
However, the report noted differences in the French and
German systems:
"The German system is closer to our own than the
French in that government spending may be reduced in
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order to cover increased EC receipts. Such cuts are
not necessarily attributed to the budget of the
Department benefitting from the receipts" (Heseltine
1991, Annexe B)
Grouped together by the second approach were Denmark and
Portugal. The report was unequivocal in stating that
Denmark operated a system of 'genuine additionality'.
"(In Denmark) there is no mechanism for reducing
public expenditure when there are additional EC
contributions, and EC receipts go directly to the
appropriate recipients" (Heseltine 1991, Annexe B)
However, it was noted that Denmark received only a
relatively small amount in ERDF grants and as such could
afford to operate this system without significant impact on
public expenditure levels.
In Portugal also, genuine additionality appeared to be
provided albeit through a different mechanism:
"In Portugal, Structural Fund receipts are treated as
being outside the state budget and are therefore not
regarded as part of public expenditure. EC funds are
distributed through a separate accounting procedure;
the consequence of this system is that once the
annual national budget is passed by Parliament it is
difficult to re-allocate resources so as to take
account of higher than anticipated EC receipts"
(Heseltine 1991, Annexe B)
The third approach outlined was the position taken in Spain.
This was identified as being closest to that of the UK
Government. Here,
"the amount by which EC receipts are allowed to
increase public spending beyond planned budget limits
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is strictly controlled.. . budget calculations are
made on the basis of combined totals of estimated EC
receipts and national contributions" (Heseltine 1991,
Annexe B).
The whole tone of the Heseltine memo was critical of the
Treasury-led government position. The comparative study,
although by the admission of the authors a 'limited view'
led to the conclusion that,
"the UK position, whilst not dissimilar to that of
Spain, remains comparatively isolated within the
Community" (Heseltine 1991, Annexe B)
Options for Change
The Heseltine Memo outlined in some detail five options that
were available to the government:
Option one was to maintain the status quo, which would lose
the UK a share of EC resources and be 'deeply embarrassing
at home and in Europe'. This option was described as
'simply not viable'.
Option wo was to extend the top-slicing arrangement to
cover up to lOO of expected ERDF expenditure and to issue
SCA5 for the projects concerned. The major drawback to this
was that. it would 'squeeze the already inadequate OSB' and
although this may help in the short term, it was 'not an
acceptable long term solution'.
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Option three was the creation of a 'territorial pool', which
may be regarded as a development of top slicing. This would
provide a pool of PES for Scotland, Wales and England each
of which would be 'held back to allow additional ERDF grants
to be issued for any appropriate recipient'. This would
satisfy Commission demands on transparency and should
satisfy the Treasury as total public expenditure would not
be affected.
Option four was similar to option three except that 'a
central pooi of PES would be held by the Treasury (or DTI)
which would be called upon whenever ERDF grant requirements
was approved or paid'. The problem with both pooi systems
however was that 'annual fluctuations leading to under or
over spends would be a continuing problem' and again, these
options were seen as falling short of a satisfactory long
term solution. The top-slicing which had occurred thus far
had been seen by Commissioner Millan as welcome but did not
provide a satisfactory solution to the additionality problem
(European Parliament 1992, p249 col 421)
Option five was that preferred by the DOE. This was
described as 'local additionality outside the planning
total'. This would mean redefining the public expenditure
planning total so as to exclude from it expenditure financed
from ERDF grants. That expenditure would, however, be
scored within the total of General Government Expenditure
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(GGE' . This was a solution that would satisfy both the
Commission and the recipients and was more straightforward
than the other options, thus minimising the administrative
costs. This solution would require new legislation so that
ERDF grant expenditure would no longer need to be covered by
a credit approval: an arrangement that already existed for
some other grants paid to local authorities. The preferred
option would not provide cover for the matching funds as
well as he EP.DF element which some critics of the existing
system believed was necessary for genuine additionality.
The eseltine memo suggested that preserving the status quo
had some advantages but these were outweighed by the factors
counting against:
Option 1: The Status Quo
Pros: 1. Present system not disrupted.
2. Minimises Commission influence on priorities.
3. No increase in administration.
Cons: 1. Not transparent.
2. No additionality at point of receipt.
3. Does not provide incentives f or all players.
4. Not neutral between different types of
recipient.
5. Does not satisfy objectives of the Commission
and grant recipients.
6. Political criticisms not met.
7. Loss of ERDF grant.
8. Repercussions in other policy areas because
of persisting with UK policy which is
disliked.
By contrast, the factors in favour of changing to option 5
far outweighed those against:
Option 5: Removing ERDF from the Planning Total
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Pros: 1. Transparent.
2. Fully additional at point of receipt.
3. Simple to administer.
4. No risk from underspend or overspend.
5. Seen as "real" additionality.
6. Neutral between recipients.
7. Incentives for everyone.
8. Good for UK reputation in Europe.
9. Popular in regions
Cons: 1. Priorities in spending constrained by
Regional Fund Priorities.
2. Apparent public expenditure increase.
(Source: Heseltine 1991, Annexe E)
In the letter accompanying the memo, Mr Heseltine indicated
that he anticipated the support of the Secretaries of State
for Wales and Scotland. These were to be the only Cabinet
ministers contacted at this stage, an indication that he
could not expect to depend on the support of other Cabinet
colleagues so readily. In December, following the release
of the letter, the indications were that there would still
be no change in the government's position. Trade and
Industry Minister Edward Leigh maintained that the delay in
the release of RECHAR funds was the fault of the Commission
and that the UK government had "bent over backwards to try
to accommodate the 'unreasonable views' of European
Commissioner Bruce Millan" (Barnsley Star 18.12.91, p3).
4.2/6 The conclusion of the dispute
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On January 21 the additionality issue once again became
headline news following its promotion by the Labour front
bench. The press release sent out by Shadow Trade and
Industry Secretary, Gordon Brown, was timed for that date
deliberately to cause the government maximum embarrassment
by appearing in the newspapers on the eve of a two-day
debate in the House of Commons on the Maastricht Bill. By
this time, support for the memo had been given by Ian Lang
and David Hunt and with some minor amendments it had been
passed on to the Chancellor, Norman Lamont. In response to
the publicity, a Downing Street spokesman informed the press
that the Prime Minister would be backing the position of the
Treasury and the DTI, the departments identified by Mr
Heseltine as the strongest advocates of the status quo. It
was interesting that the DTI, as the Department of Industry,
had previously been more critical of the Treasury's position
on additionality. However, that the Secretary of State for
Trade and Industry at this time was Peter Lilley, a well-
known Euro-sceptic, made this understandable.
On the same January day that press reports of 'Cabinet
splits' appeared, the situation was made worse for the
government with the publication of a report into EC regional
policy by the House of Lords Select Committee on the
European Communities. While this report accepted the
government's argument that it was under no legal obligation
on additionality, it argued that:
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"the Government should re-double its efforts to
satisfy the Commission by the transparency of their
procedures that the additionality principle is being
followed in the United Kingdom, that anticipated
grants from the Commission, when included in
expenditure plans, do add to what would have been
spent in regional development grant without the
grant, and grants approved by the Commission reach
the agreed areas" (Yorkshire Post 21.1.92, p5)
As the possibility of a general election increased, (the
latest date it could be take place was June 1992), the
government was increasingly concerned that the issue should
be dealt with. Mr Millan reiterated his threat to other
funds destined for the UK and the Labour party made maximum
political capital. Thus, while Mr Heseltine's 'private'
documents were critical of government policy, publicly he
began accusing Commissioner Millan of 'ganging up' with the
Labour Party ahead of a general election (Financial Times
29.1.92, p10).
The issue was clearly becoming more sensitive as the
likelihood of an early general election grew. Conservative
MPS in seats affected by the RECHAR dispute were aware of
the continuing adverse publicity for the government and
pressed for a resolution in advance of an announcement on
the general election date. With over 70 local authority
areas affected by the RECHAR dispute the issue had already
impacted upon some marginal Conservative seats in coalfield
areas, notably in the east midlands. Some of these MPS held
traditional Labour seats won by the Conservatives in 1987
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after the year-long miners strike which led to the formation
of the Union of Democratic Mineworkers (0DM) with support
from the government. Despite the creation of the IJDM, the
government's closure of coal mines had continued up to 1992
and included a number where the 13DM was the dominant union.
Thus, the public perception that the government were now
blocking financial assistance to these areas was clearly a
dangerous one for the sitting Tory MPs.
The warning that other EC structural funds might be affected
enlarged the potential geographical impact of the dispute to
non-coalfield areas and thus to other Conservative seats.
Areas such as Cumbria and Bradford were politically
important to the government and would be affected by the
spread of the dispute to other EP.DF programmes. Both of
these areas were mentioned by Mr Heseltine in his leaked
memo.
The timing of the Heseltine memo and the subsequent
publicity it received was a major boost to local
authorities, although Commissioner Millan at the time
privately commented on his displeasure in the Labour party's
use of the issue for political gain. Mr Millan believed
that if the dispute became defined in clear party political
terms it would undermine the chances of the government
giving ground. It was a strength of the Commission's
position that it had received support from across the
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parties, primarily through CCC. If some of the non-Labour
councils suspected that the dispute was connected to
Labour's campaign for re-election, this support might have
been lost to the Commission.
But the Heseltine memo itself, and particularly the timing
of its release to the press, was not without at least one
political sub-plot. Michael Heseltine had a well
established reputation for being politically ambitious:
ambitious enough to have provoked a challenge to Mrs
Thatcher's leadership only a year before. That his
challenge resulted in the election of John Major was not
necessarily the end of Mr Heseltine's ambitions. He would
have been aware that should the government have lost the
1992 general election, the Conservative party would once
again be looking for a new leader. At the time, there were
few viable candidates and Mr Heseltine, despite having made
many enemies through his challenge to Margaret Thatcher,
would once again have been a leading contender. While
publicly he continued to display unquestioning support for
the government, his 'leaked' private comments risked losing
the government support. The memo certainly raised the
stakes of the RECHAR dispute once again.
The subsequent publicity following the leaked Heseltine memo
appeared to convince a growing number of Conservatives that
the political cost of the RECHAR dispute was rapidly
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outstripping the financial costs involved. The feeling grew
among Conservative backbenchers that a settlement on RECHAR
would probably benefit the interests of the government in
the longer term. By the beginning of February 1992, this
view iad begiin to sway the Cabinet, On February 13th, the
government wrote to the Commission proposing new
arrangements for handling EP.DF receipts and on the February
17th, Mr Peter Lilley, Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry, made a Commons statement that in response to the
government's proposals Commissioner Millan had agreed to
release RECHAR funds immediately and had withdrawn his
threat to withhold other funds. By the end of February, it
was aflnounced that there would be a general election on
April 9th.
4.3 The changes in the UK government's position
The cnanges in the government's position were outlined to
Commissioner Millan in a letter to him from the UK Permanent
Representative to the Community dated February 13, 1992.
The letter stated that:
In future, published expenditure plans will show
forecast ERDF receipts separately for each
expenditure programme which receives them. There
will be a change also in the public expenditure
survey rules, so that public expenditure cover will
be made available automatically for those forecast
receipts" (Kerr 1992, p1)
180
These new arrangements would apply from 1993/94 and special
arrangements would be made for RECHAR payments in the
intervening period "to ensure that commensurate public
expenditure cover is available to the relevant spending
authorities" (Kerr 1992, p1). The changes were accompanied
by the request that the Commissioner should approve
outstanding ERDF programmes, including RECHAR.
In his response, Commissioner Millan said:
"As far as the new arrangements are concerned, the
separation of forecast ERDF receipts within each
expenditure programme seems to meet the need for
transparency... and I welcome the fact that public
expenditure cover will be made available
automatically for forecast ERDF receipts" (Millan
1992, p1)
With regard to the transitional arrangements, Commissioner
r1illan replied:
"Local authority complaints about the lack of
additional cover in relation to their RECHAR
programmes were one of the elements in my decision to
block those programmes and I hope that your assurance
that in the transitional period special arrangements
will be made available to the relevant spending
authorities will provide a solution to this aspect of
the current problem" (Millan 1992, p1)
In the light of the assurances given by the government,
Commissioner Millan indicated that he would approve the
outstanding programmes within a few days.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the government's change of
position was interpreted by critics and parts of the media
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as a 'climbdown	 Guardian 18.02.92, p20, Yorkshire Post
18.02.92, p.) . The CCC released a press statement headed
"U-Turn for Government over Euro-cash for Coalfields", in
which Chairman, C1r Hedley Salt stated:
"That the government has been forced to back down
proves that they were always wrong in operating a
system of inancia1 controls that stopped European
regional aid reaching coal areas. The government's
failure to introduce new procedures any earlier has
meant that the whole programme is now more than a
year behind schedule. . ." (Coalfield Communities
Campaign 1.32.93, p2)
However, the delight of these campaigners was not
unqualified. c:lr Salt continued:
"But I am deetJly worried by the finer details of
today's deal, which have sadly been left vague. In
principle today's deal should mean a final solution
to this long running saga. But the details do matter
if authorities are to get the full benefit. I very
much hope that the government honours its commitment
today and that it proves to be a real step forward
for coal areas, not a false dawn" (Coalfield
Communities Campaign 17.02.92)
The Commons stat.ement by Mr Lilley, made after the agreement
with Mr M1L.an, set out publicly for the first time the
government's 'revised' position. It was clear the
government were no: acknowledging that additionality had
previously been denied:
"The present system for public expenditure control will
remain unchanged. European regional development
receipts have always been taken into account in
determining forward expenditure plans which are in
consequence higher than they otherwise would be. . ."
(Peter Liley, House of Commons 17/02/92, col. 22)
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The government statement also contained one policy change
which went relatively ignored at the time, but was to be of
much significance for local authorities. Mr LiUey stated:
U	 we are taking steps to secure better value for
money by increasing competition for Britain's share of
the fund. To achieve this increased competition, the
Government want to encourage applications from a wider
range of bodies. Organisations such as British Coal
Enterprise, tJDCs and regional enterprise agencies make
a valuable contribution to regional development. We
are therefore initiating new arrangements which will
place them on an equal footing with local authorities"
(House of Commons, 17/02/92, ccl. 22)
This would mean changes in the composition of the regional
programme committees to reflect the wider range of
applicants.
Neither the statement on public expenditure or that on
increased competition for structural fund grants was
designed to enthuse local authorities. Mr Lilley at least
had decided that the announcement was not a time for
defensiveness: the government was sending out clear signals
to local authorities that the RECHAR dispute did not mean
they would henceforth have things their own way. However,
Mr Lilley explained the new arrangements on additionality
would ensure that "the coal areas will receive the money to
which they are entitled" (House of Commons, 17/02/92, col.
22) . He also added:
"I can confirm that there will be no reductions in
other funds to local authorities: there never were
any, and none was ever intended under the existing
arrangements" (House of Commons, 17/02/92, col. 24)
183
In response to a question from Alan Beith MP, Mr Lilley
stated that every penny of RECHAR would be additional to
what the government intended to spend in the areas targeted
and that local government spending and capital limits would
not prevent any of the money being spent (House of Commons,
17/02/92, col. 25) . At the time of the Lilley announcement,
it was largely assumed that the government had made
significant concessions to the European Commission, although
the details had yet to be provided.
4.4 Conclusion
On the surface, it appeared difficult to accept that after a
long dispute, more details of the agreement between the
Commission and the government were not revealed. The
agreement formally rested on an exchange of letters in which
the government appeared to guarantee additionality, but at
the same time would not increase public expenditure. Yet
the Commission did not push the government further on this,
despite the fact that the RECHAR dispute had been
precipitated because the government would not increase
public expenditure to accommodate RECHAR as additional. It
was this contradiction that made local authorities wary of
the arrangements to be announced after the general election
had taken place. Had the informal exchanges between the
Commission and the UK government also been revealed, local
authorities would have had even more cause for concern.
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As part of the deal on additionality, the government made it
clear to the Commission that any change to UK implementation
arrangements for the structural funds would be accompanied
by a government policy to encourage non-local authority
actors to bid for funds. While this was a domestic issue on
which the Commission could not officially express a view,
government ministers believed that privately, Commission
officials in IJG XVI were highly supportive of a greater role
for subnational authorities in the Community system. Thus,
this accompanying measure to the deal on additionality not
only advanced a favoured government policy by providing more
competition for local authorities, it also undermined the
latent objectives of at least some Commission officials.
While it might appear fanciful to suggest the government
revelled in the fact that the promotion of non-local
authority actors was an aspect of the deal that Commission
personnel found irritating, but powerless to argue against,
it is less fanciful when considered alongside evidence that
the government was in part motivated by revenge towards
local authorities when considering the basis of an agreement
to end the RECHAR dispute. The government had not enjoyed
the embarrassment caused by the Commission-local authority
alliance and had no wish to see it repeated.
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One local government secondee working in regional office of
central government throughout the dispute suggested that the
government intended to make local authorities "suffer" for
their explicit support for the Commission over
additionality. Moreover, some council officials were
informed of this intention during the dispute:
"The secretariat of this region warned local
authorities they would suffer because ERDF would be
opened up to other agencies and they would have to
compete. This gave them a dilemma. This information
was passed on behind the scenes by civil servants. It
was informal. Civil servants would get in to trouble
for this otherwise (Secondee, 1995)
This information was available to regional office secondees
because they "received notes of meetings between Ministers
and the Commission" (Secondee, 1995) . This information was
filtered down by secondees and regional office officials
close to local government personnel to make sure local
authorities knew the consequences of their actions. The
intention behind informing local authorities was to bring
about a speedy conclusion to the RECHAR dispute which would
leave the existing arrangements for implementing
additionality unchanged. To continue their action, local
authorities would risk losing their position as the main
developers of ERDF projects. However:
"By the time local authorities became aware of the
consequences of their actions it was too late. There
was too much of a bandwagon rolling" (Secondee, 1995)
If the government had intended primarily to make local
authorities 'suffer' for the embarrassment of the RECHAR
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dispute, then it was perhaps at least a happy coincidence
for the government that the means through which it would do
this also irritated Commission personnel and undermined the
DG XVI'S prospects if or future alliances with UK local
government over regional policy issues.
The government felt it had been wronged by both the
Commission and local authorities through their action on
additionality. It suspected a hidden agenda: that the
additionality dispute was part of a general strategy to
strengthen links between the Commission and subnational
authorities as part of a push towards a 'Europe of the
Regions' in which central government would effectively be
by-passed on a growing number of issues. While there was no
formal acknowledgement of this agenda during the RECHAR
dispute, support for a Europe of the Regions in local
government circles was hardly surprising given the recent
history of central-local relations in the UK. At the same
time, such a development had obvious advantages for the
Commission in areas such as regional policy, where national
governments were the central obstacle to the development of
a genuinely supranational policy.
The suspicion of a hidden agenda, made it more difficult for
the government to accept criticism of its position on
additionality to the point that it was not prepared to
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concede to the arguments of local authorities and the
Commission even after the agreement had been reached:
"At the time of the Lilley announcement in February
1992, there was no sense of concession in the
government office. The government got a lot into the
deal... ERDF is seen as public expenditure and the
Government will control it" (Secondee, 1995)
In this context, local authority caution over the February
1992 agreement was understandable. They had every reason to
suspect that in this case, the devil could very well be in
the detail.
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